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Abstract
In this paper we show that the inclusion of unemployment-tenure interaction vari-
ates in Mincer wage equations is subject to serious pitfalls. These variates were designed
to test whether or not the sensitivity to the business cycle of a worker’s wage varies
according to her tenure. We show that three canonical variates used in the literature
- the minimum unemployment rate during a worker’s time at the firm(minu), the un-
employment rate at the start of her tenure(Su) and the current unemployment rate
interacted with a new hire dummy(δu) - can all be significant and "correctly" signed
even when each worker in the firm receives the same wage, regardless of tenure (equal
treatment). In matched data the problem can be resolved by the inclusion in the panel
of firm-year interaction dummies. In unmatched data where this is not possible, we
propose a solution for minu and Su based on Solon, Barsky and Parker’s(1994) two
step method. This method is sub-optimal because it ignores a large amount of cross
tenure variation in average wages and is only valid when the scaled covariances of firm
wages and firm employment are acyclical. Unfortunately δu cannot be identified in
unmatched data because a diﬀerential wage response to unemployment of new hires
and incumbents will appear under both equal treatment and unequal treatment.
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1 Introduction and overview
There has been a recent upsurge in interest in the relationship between the tenure of a
worker and the sensitivity of her wages to the business cycle. Despite a burgeoning empirical
literature many issues in this area remain controversial. In particular arguments still persist
about the extent to which the wages of new hires are more sensitive to current business cycle
conditions than those of incumbents (See for example Baker,Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994.
who find they are diﬀerent and Gertler and Tregari, 2009 who find they are not).More gener-
ally, others have investigated the general relationship between a worker’s pay and the state
of the business cycle during her tenure with the firm. Establishing reliable empirical stylised
facts about these issues is crucial for macroeconomic theories of wage setting. A popular
way to investigate how the sensitivity of wages to the business cycle varies with a worker’s
tenure is the direct inclusion of tenure related cyclical variates in standard Mincer wage
equations. Three canonical examples of such variates are a) the minimum unemployment
rate during a worker’s tenure, "minu”,b) the unemployment rate of a worker at the start of
his tenure, "Su”,and c) the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire dummy,
”δu”.1 Henceforth we refer to variates such as these as unemployment-tenure interactions
or UTI’s for short. We argue in this paper that drawing inferences from the significance of
UTI variates has serious pitfalls. In particular we show that they may be significant and
"correctly" signed even when the wages of workers within a firm are equally sensitive to the
business cycle regardless of tenure. Referring to the latter situation as equal treatment -
our generic null hypothesis - we show analytically and numerically that under a a number
of plausible equal treatment models these three variates will be significant with a sign that
would lead the investigator to find falsely in favour of a model based on unequal treatment
contracts (forged via bilateral firm-worker bargaining) rather than equal treatment contracts
(usually but not necessarily forged via collective firm-workforce bargaining). The problem
- essentially one of endogenous tenure - arises because the average UTI for a firm embeds
information on its current and past hiring decisions which, under equal treatment, may be
correlated with that firm’s wage level. A solution to the problem is to include firm-year
interaction dummies.to absorb firm specific wage components. If this is done, UTI variates
will only be significant if the sensitivity of wages to the business cycle actually does vary
with tenure - our generic alternative hypothesis. Unfortunately this cure is not always avail-
able because many panel datasets do not match workers to firms, the PSID being a classic
case in point. We argue that without matched data it is impossible to identify asymmetric
responses to unemployment of wages of new hires and incumbents - the case we are calling
δu here. However for minu and Su Barsky, Parker and Solon’s(1994, henceforth SBP) two
step estimator may be adapted to control for the biases induced by the existence of common
firm specific wage components. Using the panel dimension to control for worker character-
1The last of these three is less commonly used than the fisrt two but is included because its recent use by
Gertler and Tregari (2009) has attracted some attention. Other examples are the maximum unemployment
rate since joining the firm, the maximum change in unemployment since joining the firm (see Macis, 2009)
and the product of a tenure measure and unemployment (see Arozamena and Centen(2006). Extensions of
the analysis to these ond other UTI’s should be obvious.
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istics, SBP (and subsequently Shin and Shin, 2003 and Devereux and Hart, 2007) extract
composition bias.free estimates of mean wages for diﬀerent worker tenures in each time pe-
riod. These data are then used to form a new time/tenure panel to investigate the business
cycle sensitivity of wages across diﬀerent tenures. The method was originally advanced to
circumvent the large biases in standard errors highlighted by Moulton,1990 in panels where
RHS variables such as unemployment have variation that is only a tiny fraction of that of
the dependent variable (in this case wages). We propose adding extra regressors to annihi-
late the biases in UTI estimates caused by equal treatment. However our proposed method
is clearly inferior to adding firm-year interaction dummies to the original panel. Not only
does it remove much of the cross tenure variation in wages but to work eﬀectively it also
requires normalised covariances between firm hiring and firm wages to be constant across
the business cycle.We close the paper with a small empirical illustration from the PSID. In
the application negative estimates of UTI eﬀects from the panel dimension change sign and
become insignificant when we apply the modified SBP method.
We emphasise at this point what this paper does not say. We do not argue that the
tenure related cyclical eﬀects found so far in the literature (in particular, the significantly
negative coeﬃcients found on minu, Su and δu) are necessarily spurious. Instead the paper
makes the important methodological point that UTI’s may be spuriously significant and
"correctly" signed. Furthermore it is quite likely that a large economy will be characterised
by bargaining practices that vary from sector to sector. Some sectors could be characterised
by equal treatment contracting whereas others could be characterised by unequal treatment
(see for example Kilponen and Santavirta, 2010, who find variations in the importance of
diﬀerent contract mechanisms across diﬀerent sectors of the Finnish economy). If this is the
case, our results would also indicate that estimates of tenure specific cyclical eﬀects may be
biased rather than simply spurious. Whether or not this bias is upwards (towards zero) or
downwards will depend on the nature of firm level bargaining in the sectors that are subject to
equal treatment. For example in this paper we identify a number of equal treatment models
that generate spurious negative coeﬃcients on minu. Even if these types of models are only
relevant in a portion of the economy the coeﬃcient on minu will still be downward biased.
This would lead the investigator to an exaggerated view of the quantitative importance in
the economy as a whole of the contracting environment that minu was designed to test for.
Whilst it makes sense to focus this paper on equal treatment models capable of generating
the negative signs on UTI’s that we see in the empirical literature, we acknowledge that
negative signs are not generic - other models will generate positive coeﬃcients on UTI’s In
such cases an exactly converse could be invoked - namely that the quantitative importance of
the relevant unequal treatment contracting mechanism could be underestimated. Whatever
the case, it is essential in these empirical exercises to add firm-year interaction dummies
to get an unbiased take on the quantitative importance (or not) of the relevant unequal
treatment unequal treatment bargaining mechanism that is being tested by the particular
UTI.
Second, it is well known that any variate that is correlated with a worker’s tenure such
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as minu2 will also be potentially correlated with wages if human capital accrues through
job experience. As pointed out by other authors, if tenure related human capital is not
adequately controlled for, variates such as minu could be significant in Mincer equations
even in the absence of tenure specific business cycle eﬀects. The modus operandi of this
eﬀect, however, is completely diﬀerent to ours and to emphasise this point we show UTI’s
will be significant even in the absence of tenure related human capital. Having said this,
tenure is nearly always included in Mincer equations and its inclusion will aﬀect the biases
on UTI’s. To assess the impact of this, we examine the impact of adding tenure measures
to Mincer equations in numerical simulations at the end of the paper.
Thirdly and in a similar vein to the human capital argument, Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2010) argue that minu and Su are significant because they proxy for unobserved match
quality in a market clearing model with on the job search. They propose new proxies for
match quality and argue that including these in a wage equation drives out the significance
of minu and Su.Once again the modus operandi of their eﬀect is completely diﬀerent to ours
and our results obtain in a world without unobservable match quality. Furthermore, in 4.6
below we argue that two of Hagedorn and Manovskii’s newly proposed match quality proxies
may themselves be spuriously significant in models of equal treatment even where workers
always have identical match productivity and labour markets do not necessarily clear. In
our paper, the potential spurious significance of tenure related cyclical variates is generated
by the cross sectional correlation of firm wages with firm hiring decisions rather than via
diﬀerences in human capital or match quality across workers.
The paper is organised as follows.Section 2 overviews the literature - theoretical and em-
pirical - of wage setting in relation to the business cycle. Emphasis here is on the distinction
between models that are founded on unequal treatment versus those founded on equal treat-
ment. The former are necessarily founded on firm-worker bilateral bargaining whilst the
latter are often - but not always - founded on firm-workforce collective bargaining.In section
3 we illustrate the main results of the paper via two simple illustrative models, A and B. In
section 4 we derive the properties of (pooled) panel regression estimates of UTI’s under a
generic alternative hypothesis of equal treatment within the firm. In this section we sharpen
the main findings by assuming that wages and employment depend only on firm specific
idiosyncratic shocks and hence display no aggregate business cycle. To avoid singularity of
some of the regressions we assume that aggregate labour supply and hence the aggregate
unemployment rate are variable. Despite the absence of a business cycle in aggregate wages
and employment, estimated UTI coeﬃcients are asymptotically nonzero and often take the
expected negative sign. Also in this section we oﬀer a digression which suggests that Hage-
dorn and Manowskii’s match quality proxies may themselves be spuriously significant under
equal treatment models where match quality is completely absent and where markets do not
necessarily clear. In section 5 we analyse a number of specific equal treatment contracting
models and establish that under these "alternative" models the probability limit of the re-
gression estimates are non zero In Section 6 we run simulations to quantify the estimated
2It is easy to show (we do so below) that variates like minu can be re-written as a linear combination of
tenure dummies.
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spurious eﬀects in the more realistic setting of both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. We
find that under several plausible parameter scenarios in two equal treatment models, the
UTI’s estimates have a similar order of magnitude to those found in the empirical literature.
Section 7 discusses SBP’ method and its extensions used by Devereux and Hart(2007) .We
show that these methods do not eliminate the problem. However if scaled cross sectional
wage-employment covariances are acyclical, time t averages of composition-free wages can
be used to obtain estimates of UTI’s that are zero under the null of equal treatment and
consistent under the alternative. A small empirical application to the PSID in this section
shows that applying our method reverses the initially "correct" signs of initial panel based
UTI coeﬃcient estimates.
2 Models of wage formation and the business cycle
Much of the current theoretical macro literature on wage formation focuses on models where
individual workers bargain with a firm bilaterally and independently of existing contracts
that exist within that firm. Classic and vintage examples of these bilateral contracting mod-
els are the implicit contract models of Beaudry and Dinardo (1991 - henceforth BDN) and a
host of search theoretic models that grew (and are growing) out of Mortensen and Pissarides’
(1994) seminal paper (e.g. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006)3 In these models wages at
time t are aﬀected by the state of the economy (or more specifically the level of firm labour
productivity) at the time of entry into the firm and may also depend on the state of the
economy subsequent to that date. Hence the current level of an individual’s wages is deter-
mined by the state of the business cycle - usually measured as the aggregate unemployment
rate - at the start of and during his tenure.
There is, however, another class of contracting models where, for a given level of human
capital be it firm or worker specific, each worker within the firm is paid the same wage. In
these "equal treatment" models the wage may vary over the business cycle, but crucially is
independent of a worker’s tenure (again, modulo human capital). These models imply equal
treatment in the sense that no matter how bad(good) current economic conditions are, new
workers are not oﬀered lower (higher) wages than incumbents. Classic and vintage examples
are the eﬃciency wage models of Shapiro and Stiglitz(1984) and its variants and insider-
outsider models such as that of Blanchard and Summers(1986). More recent examples are
search theoretic models with a) staggered contracting (Gertler and Trigari, 2009), b) wage
norms (Hall, 2005), c) bargaining over the marginal surplus under diminishing returns to
labour (Elsby, 2010) and d) market clearing but with idiosyncratic unobserved match quality
3In most of these models, constant returns to scale implies that the economy contains "jobs" not "firms".
To take the models to the data where firms obviously do exist requires us to think of each firm as housing a
number of jobs each with a wage determined by the bilateral bargain struck between the worker and the firm
at the time of the job’s inception. With firms so defined, the model predicts wage dispersion within firms
even across workers of identical human capital.. Under equal treatment, however, wage dispersion within
the firm can only occur via diﬀerences in human capital something that we abstract from in this paper.
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(Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2010). Finally the contracting models of Snell and Thomas(2010)
and Martins, Snell and Thomas(2005,2010) build in equal treatment within the firm at the
outset.
Whilst many of the bilateral contract models are assessed via their abilities to reproduce
the salient moments of the relevant macro data (such as employment,wage and vacancy
variability over the business cycle) companion empirical work tests the theory at hand by
examining the significance of some tenure specific cyclical variable, typically a UTI.such as
minu. Significance of these variates when they are included in standard panel wage (Mincer)
equations is construed as being supportive of both unequal treatment and of the particular
type of bargaining that the variate was designed to capture. For example in one version of
BDN’s bilateral contract model, wages of new hires are synchronised with the state of the
cycle at the time of joining the firm but because workers are mobile, wages must rise as the
labour markets tighten in order to retain the worker. By contrast when the labour market
slackens, the insurance implicit in the contract prevents workers’ wages from falling. In an
extension to their basic model (where they add an alternative to formal employment that
displays aggregate diminishing returns), BDN show that the minimum unemployment rate
since the worker joined the firm or "minu” for short is a suﬃcient statistic for his wages. The
significance of minu in their empirics therefore, is taken as evidence against equal treatment
and in favour of the specific form of bilateral bargaining embodied in their model. Another
variant of the BDN model assumes worker commitment via costly labour mobility. In this
world it is unemployment at the start of tenure that determines the worker’s wage so that Su
and not minu is the relevant variate. They also test a spot market model whereby u itself
(the current unemployment rate) is the only relevant variable.Using data from the CPS and
PSID they find minu dominates both Su and u. Subsequent empirical papers by Mcdonald
and Worswick(1999) and Grant(2003) have found similar results with minu being by far the
most robustly significant and correctly (negatively) signed of the three.
In a similar vein adherents of the Mortensen and Pissarides (henceforth MP) mod-
elling approach measure the extent to which wages of new hires and incumbents diﬀer-
entially respond to current economic conditions. Adding u and δu (unemployment and an
unemployment-new hire dummy interaction term) to a wage equation would help establish
the extent of (if any) the diﬀerential response of new hire versus incumbent wages to cur-
rent economic conditions. Finding such a diﬀerential would provide support for the bilateral
contracting in the model. It would also aid the calibration of the model by quantifying
the sensitivity of the bargained wage to current economic conditions (the worker’s outside
option). Gertler and Trigari (2009).extend the Mortensen and Pissarides model to allow for
staggered contracts but they assume that devising new contracts for new hires incurs costs so
that all wages within the firm are adjusted together - in short they assume equal treatment.
In their companion empirical work they add u and ∂u.to a standard Mincer equation and
find that after controlling for spell fixed eﬀects ∂u is insignificant. They conclude that the
wages of new hires have the same exposure to the business cycle as do those of incumbents.
Further examples of papers that include UTI’s in Mincer equations include:- Montuenga,
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Garcia and Fernandez(2006), who addminu to an otherwise standard wage curve for a group
of EU countries, Schmieder and von Wachter (2010), who extend BDN’s analysis to test for
equality of minu coeﬃcients between two consecutive work spells,.Hartog, Opstal and Teul-
ings(1997), who use UTI’s to analyse inter industry wage diﬀerentials, Bertrand(2004) and
Kilponen and Santavirta (2010) who use UTI’s to assess the eﬀects on wages of import com-
petition, Arozamena and Centeno(2006) who interact unemployment with a tenure measure
to allow for cyclicality to vary with tenure, Vilhubert(1999) who uses UTI’s to assess wage
flexibility in Germany and Bell, Nickell and Quintini(2000) who add UTI’s to an otherwise
standard wage curve. Authors using SBP’ method to estimate the importance of UTI’s
include Shin and Shin (2003) and Devereux and Hart(2007).
3 Two simple illustrative models
In this section we fix ideas and intuition for our main results by analysing two simple equal
treatment models which we call Model A and Model B. The main focus of the example is falls
on δu because it is the easiest of the three to examine. But for Model B”s simple structure
also allows us to analyse minu and Su as well.
In keeping with the analytical results in the first half of this paper we work with one
cross section at time t and abstract from the business cycle by assuming that all shocks to
wages and employment are firm specific and idiosyncratic. Whilst this implies aggregate
employment and wages are constant it leaves unspecified the time series properties of labour
supply and hence of aggregate unemployment. Here and henceforth the phrase "business
cycle" refers to a cycle in aggregate wages and employment rather than in unemployment.
Normally one would regress wages on δu and on ut itself with the coeﬃcient on former
representing the diﬀerential eﬀect. However the assumed absence of a business cycle allows
us to focus on a single cross section so that ut is constant and can be ignored Therefore, to
get an estimate of the coeﬃcient on δu we regress the wages of worker i in firm j at time t
(wijt) on a new hire dummy times the unemployment rate.(δ0ijtut).
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In practice it would be foolish to try and identify the eﬀect of the business cycle on
wages using a single cross section and it would be impossible to do so when no business
cycle is present. But attempting to do so illustrates our main point:- even in a world with no
business cycle and where there is equal treatment we may still get significant UTI estimates.
The modus operandi of the eﬀect we identify in this paper is that the significance of the
coeﬃcient on the UTI (in this case bβδu) arises from cross sectional (more specifically cross-
firm) wage variation rather than from its time series correlation with current and past levels
of unemployment. Later in the paper we show - again in the absence of a business cycle -
4Note that the orthogonal complement of ∂0ijtut namely (1− ∂0ijt)ut or the unemployment rate (ut) itself
should also be included to assess diﬀerential eﬀects of the business cycle on new hires. It is easy to show
that in the absence of business cycles - the initial scenario under which we operate - that omitting either
term is innocuous.
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that the results on the signs of biases from a single cross section extend to those obtained
from a full panel.
For a single cross section it is easy to show that bβδu can be written as
bβδu = 1ut (w0 − w1)
where w0(w1) is the average wage of new hires (incumbents). If wages in the economy
were set via an unequal treatment process such as that in MP’s search model, we would
expect the wages of new hires to be diﬀerent from incumbents according to the current value
of the outside option - here the level of ut - .and hence bβδu would diverge from zero. However
we show here that bβδu also diverges from zero under equal treatment within the firm. Before
we give the derivations we give a brief heuristic explanation as to why this is so.
Models A and B specify binary values for wages arising from "high-paying" and "low-
paying" firms respectively. In Model A, firms will be subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks which feed into downward sloping labour demand schedules. This will imply low
employment levels in high wage firms and vice versa. Ceteris paribus and with exogenous
labour turnover, the high paying firms will recruit fewer new hires whilst low paying firms will
recruit more new hires.Therefore new hires will predominantly come from low paying firms
and the mean wage of new hires will be low relative to the mean of incumbents’ wages. As
a result the estimated coeﬃcient on δu will be negative.and the investigator would conclude
that the wages of new hires are more sensitive to the business cycle despite the fact that all
workers within each firm are paid the same and there is no business cycle for wages to be
sensitive to. This problem is essentially one of selection bias leading to endogenous tenure..
In Model B, we maintain the idea that some firms pay high wages and others low but
this time wages are not driven by shocks and firms do not change from being high to low
wage or vice versa. We assume that high wage firms have a higher exogenous rate of worker
survival and vice versa low wage firms.As in Model A, high paying firms will recruit fewer
new hires except here it will be because of lower exogenous labour turnover.rather than a
downward sloping MPL schedule. Once again new hires will predominantly go to low wage
firms and the estimated coeﬃcient on δu will be negative.
Model A is interesting because it embeds a simple economic mechanism and because it
incorporates firm specific shocks explicitly. Model B has no shocks but does reflect two key
empirical regularities of many labour markets namely the existence of a wage size premium
(whereby larger firms tend to pay higher wages) and the existence of lower labour turnover
in high wage (large) firms. These features of Model B combined with its simplicity allow
us to calibrate it and to obtain numerical values for the probability limits of all three UTI
coeﬃcients under various parameter scenarios.
8
3.1 Model A
Consider the following very simple equal treatment model for wages (wjt), labour force (Ljt)
and New hires (NHjt) of firm j at time t.
wjt = K − αLjt Inverse Labour Demand(logMPL)
Ljt = L+ ξjt Employment in Sector/Firm j
Ljt−1 = L Initial Employment in Sector/F irm j
NHjt = Ljt − sLjt−1 = (1− s)L+ ξjt.where 0 < s < 1 New Hires
pr(ξjt = ξ) = pr( ξjt = −ξ) = .5 Idiosyncratic Labour Supply Shock
where MPL stands for marginal productivity of labour. For simplicity, assume that
L and ξ are strictly positive integers and that the parameters K,α and s are such as to
guarantee that Ljt and sL are strictly positive integers, that NHjt is a positive integer and
that wjt is always strictly positive. This implies that there will be at least one new hire and
one incumbent worker and that there will be no layoﬀs.
There are two ways to interpret this model. One would be to think of each firm having
a union that sets a labour force.target that is either high (ξjt = ξ) or low (ξjt = −ξ). 5.
The firm takes its target as a given when it sets wages and reads oﬀ the relevant wage from
its MPL schedule, which for simplicity we assume is not subject to productivity shocks6.
Alternatively we could think of the model as a market clearing segmented labour market
model with exogenous within sector labour supply shocks. In that case j would not be a
firm but a distinct labour market or sector.and the inverse labour demand schedule would
be the aggregation of individual schedules across firms in the sector. In what follows we refer
merely to "firm" without wishing to imply any preference over these two interpretations.
The model generates a complete cross section of wages wijt paid by firm j at time t to
each of its Ljt workers. At time t there will be high wage firms (those whose labour supply
shock is −ξ) and low wage firms (those whose labour supply shock is ξ). Because of the
downward slopingMPL schedule and the fact that the number of surviving incumbents (sL)
is identical across firms, high paying firms will have fewer new hires than low paying firms.
Most new hires will therefore come from low paying firms whilst incumbents will be spread
evenly across low and high paying firms. Therefore the economy wide average wage of new
hires will be lower than that of incumbents and bβ will be negative. Suppose that n1(n2) firms
5To complete this simple model we would have to invent a device that stopped workers in low wage
firms switching to higher paying firms within the time period.One such device would be to have a pool of
unemployed workers whose utility of unemployment is ss low that they would never quit any job. Newly
"churned" and existing unemployed workers could then receive a job with some probability, pt.
6It is easy to show that the example’s results do not change if one adds a productivity shock to each
firm’s MPL schedule.
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have high(low) draws of ξjt where n1+n2 = n Using p0h(p
1
h) to denote the proportion of new
hires (incumbents) that are receiving the high wage wH and using (1− p0h) and (1− p1h) to
denote the proportion of new hires and incumbents respectively that are receiving the low
wage wLthen the average wages of incumbents and new hires will be respectively
w0 = wL(1− p0h) + p0hwH = (K − αL− ξ)(1− p0h) + (K − αL+ ξ)p0h
= K − αL+ (2p0h − 1)ξ
w1 = wL(1− p1h) + p1hwH = (K − αL− ξ)(1− p1h) + (K − αL+ ξ)p1h
= K − αL+ (2p1h − 1)ξ
The proportions p0h and p
1
h are just
p0h =
n1{L(1− s)− ξ}
n1{L(1− s)− ξ}+ n2{L(1− s) + ξ}
and
p1h =
n1sL
n1sL+ n2sL
=
n1
n1 + n2
Taking probability limits as the number of firms goes to infinity gives p lim(n1n ) = p lim(
n2
n ) =
1
2
.so that
p lim p0h = {
1
2
− ξ
2L(1− s)
} and
p lim p1h =
1
2
.
As expected then, the proportion of new hires getting the higher wage is lower than the
proportion of incumbents getting it (i.e. lower than 1
2
). Using these expressions to recompute
p lim bβ gives
p lim bβδu = 1utp lim(w0 − w1) = 2ξut (p lim p0h − p lim p1h)
= − ξ
2
L(1− s)ut
< 0
As noted already we show later that in the absence of a business cycle the sign of p lim bβ
for a single cross section is the same as that for a full panel. In short the investigator would
deduce that new hires were more sensitive to the business cycle than incumbents even though
there is equal treatment within firms and a business cycle does not exist.
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It is easy to show that this result is not sensitive to random sampling whereby one takes
a random draw of proportion p of the economy’s workers.provided the number of firms being
sampled is large.We show this explicitly in the more general case later in the paper.The
addition of worker fixed eﬀects in panels does not remove the problem either. If say, we
extend the dataset in Model A to include time t − 1 and consider pooled estimation of
this panel.and if we assume that ut ≈ ut−1 ≈ u (a reasonable assumption if the shocks are
idiosyncratic across firms and n is large).then it is trivial but tedious to show that adding
worker fixed eﬀects gives exactly the same expression for p lim bβ as above. Adding worker
fixed eﬀects will subtract the time average wage of worker i from his actual wage,wijt, whereas
what one really needs to do to eliminate the problem is to subtract the firm specific wage
at time t from wijt.instead. It is the firm specific component of wages that is generating the
spurious nonzero p lim bβ under equal treatment models and adding worker fixed eﬀects will
not remove it. Obviously adding firm fixed eﬀects will remove the problem in a single cross
section. But in a full panel - where firm employment and wages are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks - we would need firm-year interaction dummies to remove the problematic firm specific
component of wages.
3.2 Model B
Model A above implies a negative covariance between sector employment and sector log wage,
wjt (henceforth just "wage").which in turn comes from a downward sloping MPL schedule.
In the labour economics literature however it is widely believed that the covariance between
a firm’s size Ljt (alternatively its average size over time) and its wages wjt (alternatively its
average wage over time) is mildly positive.not negative - a size wage premium. For example
Lallemand et al (2003) estimate that in some EU countries a doubling of firm size - ceteris
paribus - raises wages by around 5%. Furthermore it is well established empirically that large,
high wage firms have lower labour turnover than do small, low wage firms. For example in
the Survey of Consumer Finances, firms with <100 employees have an average turnover rate
greater than 40% whilst for those with more than 100 employees the average rate is around
20% (Even and Macpherson,1996). We now turn to a simple ad hoc model - Model B - that
reflects these empirical regularities.
We maintain the high wage and low wage firm structure of Model A but here we do not
specify an economic mechanism that might support this. Model B does not need to specify
the size of individual firms but in accordance with the wage size premium.it would be natural
to think of the high wage firms as being larger than the low wage firms. Because this model
is so simple we can derive explicit forms for all three UTI 0s rather than just δu alone as
above and we can calibrate the model to get numerical coeﬃcient values under a variety of
parameter settings.
We assume firms either pay high wages (wijt = wht ) or low wages (wijt = w
l
t) and that
proportion ph(pl) of time t’s labour force work in high(low) wage firms. For simplicity we
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assume that s, ph and pl do not change over time although wht and w
l
t may do so. Finally
high wage firms are assumed to have survival rate sh which exceeds that for low wage firms
(sl). This is a crucial assumption and one that accords with empirical evidence.
To derive a form for the UTI coeﬃcient for minu (bβ minu) we could simply treat the
group of firms paying high wages (and having low labour turnover) as a single high wage
"firm".and do likewise for the low wage sector. Employment in both sectors (Lh and Ll) is
constant by assumption and this makes the tenure structure very simple. For the two sectors
(indexed by i = h and i = l) the number of tenure k workers surviving at time t (Li(k)t ) is
just
Li(k)t = s
k
i (L
i
t−k − siLit−k−1)
= ski {(1− si)Li} i = h, l
Each worker of tenure k will have the same minu.value so the average minu in the high
wage sector (mht ) and in the low wage sector (m
l
t) is
mit =
( ∞X
k=0
ski (L
i
t−k − siLit−k−1)umt−k
)
/Lit
= (1− si)
∞X
k=0
ski u
m
t−k i = h, l
Note that by replacing umt−k with ut−k we get an exact formula for the "Su" case and we
denote this as Sht (S
l
t) for high(low) wage firms. We can rewrite the expression for m
i
t more
informatively as
mit = ut −
∞X
k=1
ski (u
m
t−k+1 − umt−k) i = h, l
In this last expression, the term in braces is always weakly positive and because sl < sh
it follows that mht < m
l
t
Using some tedious OLS arithmetic we can now show that the three coeﬃcient estimates
for our UTI’s are
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bβδu = p{(1− sh) + (1− slp)}{sh + slp}ut{(sh − sl)(wl − wh)}bβminu = phpl(mht −mlt)(wht − wlt)
phmh(2)t + plm
l(2)
t − (phmht + plmlt)2
where mi(2)t = (1− si)
∞X
k=0
ski (u
m
t−k)
2 i = l, h
bβSu = phpl(Sht − Slt)(wht − wlt)
phSh(2)t + plS
l(2)
t − (phSht + plSlt)2
where Sit = (1− si)
∞X
k=0
ski ut−k i = l, h
Si(2)t = (1− si)
∞X
k=0
ski u
2
t−k i = l, h
Because sl < sh and mht < m
l
t both bβδu and bβminu are negative.for any sequence of reali-
sations of aggregate unemployment ut, ut−1, ut−2... The sign of (Sht −Slt) will however depend
on the realisations for aggregate unemployment so the sign of bβSu cannot be determined in
advance of these realisations.
To get a feel for numerical values we might expect from a cross section estimation 7we
conduct a simple and crude calibration exercise based on data from the US economy. Below
are data from the US Census Bureau on private sector employment by firm size.
FirmSize 1− 4 5− 9 10− 19 20− 99 100− 499 5000− 9999
Employees(m) 5.8 6.9 8.5 20.6 16.8 6.4
500− 749 750− 999 1000− 1499 1500− 2499 2500− 4999 10000+
3.5 2.3 3.4 4.4 6.0 30.5
Using this data to rank employees by the size of the firm that they work in then the
median worker’s firm size is about 300 employees. In terms of Model B’s notation above we
could label those workers working in firms of less than 300 employees "l” type and those
above as "h" type. In this case, pl = ph = .5. Assuming a wage size premium elasticity
of 5% 8 then, if the above firm size distribution applied for regardless of worker skill and
industry sector, the wage premium for the above model i.e. wht − wlt would be about 40%.
7It is easy to show that in our acyclical world estimates from the full panel are a (positive) weighted
average of the cross sectional estimates.
8Studies by Lallemand, et.al (2003) for European economies and by Oi and Idson (1999) find elasticities
in the range 0 to 10% with an average estimate near to 5%.
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We set sl and sh equal to .6 and .8 respectively. If our reference points are the average firm
size for "l” and ”h” category workers respectively, .6 and .8 are roughly consistent with the
1988-91 NLSY data in Even and Macpherson,(1996) referred to above. Finally to calibrate
Sit , S
i(2)
t ,m
i
t and m
i(2)
t we use the realisations of annual US unemployment since 1948.and set
ut in the δu formula to 5%. These calibrated values give estimates of bβminu,bβδu and bβSu of
−2.14,−9.98 and −.78 respectively. The value for minu is higher than those found in the
literature by BDN, Shin and Shin etc. where the average estimate is around −5.0 but the
numbers for Su and δu are a similar order of magnitude to estimates found in empirical
work. Whilst the model and its calibration represent a rather crude caricature of the salient
stylised facts of US labour markets, the exercise does at least show that the eﬀect we identify
in this paper is potentially quantitatively important.
3.3 Combining the features of Model A and Model B
Model A incorporates shocks and allows firm employment to vary in size over time around
a constant mean whilst keeping survival rates fixed. It also displays a negative wage size
premium. Model B by contrast does not allow firm employment to vary over time but does
allow survival rates to increase with firm size.and generates a positive wage-size premium. In
the analysis below we consider models that combine the features of Model A and B. Explicitly
we consider an economy where all firms set wages subject to shocks (as in Model A) but
where firms sit in one of two separate subeconomies - one where firms have low mean wages,
low mean employment and low survival rates and another where they have high mean wages,
high mean employment and high survival rates (as per Model B).This allows for period by
period firm specific shocks (and later in the numerical simulations, for aggregate shocks also),
a positive wage size premium, a positive correlation between the firm’s worker survival rate
and its mean wage and a positive correlation between the firm’s worker survival rate and its
mean employment. All of these features are key stylised facts that obtain in most labour
markets. The model also emphasises our view that large,high-wage and high worker survivor
rate firms do not become small, low-wage, low worker survivor rate firms - at least not in
the sorts of time span of the typical labour economists’ panel dataset.
4 Estimates of UTI eﬀects under equal treatment
In this section we expose analytically the behaviour of estimates of our three UTI variates
under equal treatment within the firm. We derive our results under a single fixed economy
wide worker survival9 rate to allow us to obtain closed form solutions for estimates etc. The
formulae are easily adapted to allow form possible survival rates (si, i = 1, 2..m) by grouping
the firms into sectors each of which corresponds to a fixed s value.We do this for the simple
9In this paper we prefer to deal with worker survival rates rather than labour turnover rates. The latter
is of course one minus the former.
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case ofm = 2 i.e. an economy with high and low s sectors with the high s sector having a high
mean wage and high mean employment and vice versa for the low s sector. In this analysis
it is important that the designation is fixed over time and independent of the shocks.that
impinge on firms. This is consistent with a world where shocks that aﬀect employment and
wages in high and low firms are temporary and small relative to the diﬀerence in mean wages
and mean employment between high and low firms. Hence, despite suﬀering idiosyncratic
shocks over time, large high wage/high survival rate firms do not become small, low wage/low
survival rate firms and vice versa.10
The main aim in this section is to establish conditions on the cross section covariance
of firm/sector wages and firm/sector employment under which these estimates have a non
zero and negative probability limit. The plan is to start by analysing a single cross section
and then to establish results for the full panel afterwards.As noted above we sharpen our
analytical results - and simplify them - by abstracting from a business cycle - all shocks are
idosyncratic rather than aggregate. The eﬀects of allowing for a business cycle in wages and
employment are considered via numerical simulations in section 6.
We assume we have a complete sample of workers in n firms which constitute the economy.
Of course few datasets will be anything like this comprehensive (although the QP from
Portugal approaches this). In subsection 4.8, we discuss the eﬀects of random sampling of
only proportion p of the workforce in the economy.and show that although this complicates
the analytical details it does not change the central results.as long as the number of firms
being sampled is large. As stressed above this paper abstracts from human capital. Our equal
treatment hypothesis is that workers within a firm receive the same wage.up to an (worker
specific) idiosyncratic shock.11. Finally we assume that the worker survival rate in each firm
is exogenous and is suﬃciently low to avoid the firm having to make layoﬀs. Allowing for
layoﬀs would introduce nonlinearities which would seriously confound the analysis.but we do
not believe it is central to our results.12
4.1 OLS estimates of β in a single cross section under equal treat-
ment
In what follows we consider regressions of wages on (an intercept and) a single UTI - hence
we deal with each of our three UTI’s separately and in turn.We wish to derive results for
10The literature on the wage size premium focuses on both diﬀerences in plant and firm size. Obviously
over a long period of time, both plant size and firm size can grow in size. So our fixed assignation of firms
into small and large size is consistent with the relatively small T assumption of the paper.
11This may be measurement error and although we generally abstract from human capital here it could
also be idiosyncratic human capital i.e. human capital that is uncorrelated across workers and uncorrelated
with tenure and macro variates.
12We should note that the average rate of annual firm level labour force turnover in the US is high -
about 30% - although we admit that not all of this will be due to worker quits. One way of defending our
assumption of no layoﬀs is by saying that the results only apply in data where adverse shocks to the firm
are not too severe.
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a panel dataset over time periods t = 1, ...T, firms j = 1, ..n13 and individuals i = 1...Ljt
within those firms.but as noted above we start with a single cross section. We therefore
estimate for a single time period t
wijt = α+ βcijt + errorijt (1)
where wijt is log of wages of individual i in firm j at t and cijt and errorijt are that
individual’s UTI cyclical variable and error (both to be specified) respectively.
We focus on three specific cases for c namely the aggregate unemployment rate times a
new hire dummy, cijt = ∂0ijtut ("δu”)
14 the minimum aggregate unemployment rate seen by
worker i at time t since he/she joined firm j, cijt = minuijt, (”minu”) and the aggregate
unemployment rate at the start of worker i0s tenure at firm j, cijt = Suijt.("Su”). It should
become clear that the analysis could be extended quite easily to other UTI variates.such as
"maxu” the maximum unemployment rate since a worker joined the firm (relevant where
there is one-sided (worker) commitment). A significantly negative estimate of β is typically
interpreted by the investigator as support for the existence of the relevant form of bilateral
contracting.
Of course (1) is not a proper regression equation.but is merely a statement of what the
investigator is estimating. Suppose now that (1) is in fact a mispecification in the sense that
wijt is not directly related to cijt. Instead wages are equal to a firm specific component plus
worker specific shock i.e.
wijt = wjt + vijt (2)
E(vijt,cijt) = 0 E(vijt,wijt) = 0 (3)
This equation makes clear what we mean by equal treatment - diﬀerences in wages may
exist but these diﬀerences must not be correlated with UTI’s. In adopting (1) we have
ignored education and worker tenure as regressors.whilst the literature obviously includes
them Excluding the former is innocuous in the absence of human capital but excluding
worker tenure.is not - tenure is manifestly correlated with cijt and adding it to the regression
will change the estimates of the UTI parameters. The eﬀect of adding tenure to the regression
in (1) is taken up in the numerical simulations in section 6 below.
13Here n is assumed to be fixed across time but this is merely a notational simplification. The analysis
whereby n is time subscripted would merely require the additional assumption that min(n1, n2..nT )− >∞
for the asymptotics to carry through.
14In the δu case the investigator always includes the aggregate unemployment rate ut as well as δu. In this
section we use a single cross section within which ut is constant so adding an intercept makes its omission
irrelevant. It is easy to show under our assumption of acyclical firm employment and wages that omitting
ut from the panel regression is likewise innocuous. A proof of this is available on request.
Finally the analysis that applies to cijt = ∂0ijtut is trivially extended to its orthogonal counterpart - the
unemployment rate times an incumbent dummy cijt = (1− ∂0ijt)ut.
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The regression estimate β for a single cross section of Lt workers is
bβ = 1
svar(cijt)
(scov(wijt, cijt)) (4)
where scov(.) and svar(.) are sample covariance and variance respectively. Later, we
extend the results to a panel where T the number of time periods is fixed and small relative
to the number of firms.n.With this in mind we now analyse the sign of bβ as n goes to infinity.
The denominator in (4) is always positive so we can focus exclusively on the sign of the
numerator.
Proposition 1:- The numerator in (4) can be written as
scov(wijt, cijt) =
1
Lt
Ã
scovf(wjt, cjt)− scovf(Ljt, wjt).
1
Lt
nX
j=1
cjt
!
+ op(1) (5)
Proof: - See Appendix
where scovf denotes sample covariance across firms j = 1, 2...n at time t.rather than
across individuals. We note that in the absence of aggregate shocks to firm employment
p limLt = L is constant over time.
(5) is an important equation. It shows us that under an alternative hypothesis of equal
treatment where wages and employment are acyclical, bβminu, bβSu and bβδu will in general not
be zero and will take values that depend on the cross firm covariance of wages (wjt) with
within firm UTI’s. The latter will be a weighted average of current and past employment
levels of the firm where the weights are identical across firms. For example in the case
of δu and where the rate of labour turnover 1 − s is fixed across firms, cjt will be just
(Ljt − sLjt−1)ut.Therefore, in models where the firm’s wage policy (wj) depends on current
and past labour force levels, the cross firm correlation of wjt and cjt will in general be nonzero
even though δu is by assumption irrelevant to the wage policies of firms.
We develop further the above expressions for specific choices of cijt namely, minu, Su
and ∂u (and implicitly therefore, (1 − ∂)u). We then discuss the signs of the probability
limits of the respective regression coeﬃcients (bβminu, bβSu and bβδu).in an economy that has
firms with identical mean wages, mean employment and survival rates. We then extend the
results on sign to cases of heterogenous mean employment, mean wages and survival rates.
4.2 Minimum unemployment rate during tenure:- minu
We start by developing expressions for cjt = minujt (the "aggregate" minu within firm j).
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The cijt variate for the minu case is a tenure dummy for worker i multiplied by the
minimum unemployment rate associated with her length of tenure. The sum of within-firm
tenure dummies for any entry date k is
∂kjt =
LtX
i=1
∂kijt ≡ Ltjt−k − Ltjt−k−1 (6)
where ∂kijt = 1 if worker i is of tenure k and ∂
k
ijt = 0 if not. The "aggregate" minu within
a firm (minujt) will be related to past hiring and the cohort composition of the current
labour force as follows
minujt
⎛
⎝=
LjtX
i=1
minuijt
⎞
⎠ =
∞X
k=0
∂kjtu
m
t−k =
∞X
k=0
(Ltjt−k − Ltjt−k−1)umt−k (7)
=
∞X
k=0
sk(Ljt−k − sLjt−k−1)umt−k (8)
Following the lead of the analysis in Model B above we can collect terms diﬀerently to
get a diﬀerent and more useful form for this expression as
minujt = Ljtut −
∞X
k=1
skLjt−k(umt−k+1 − umt−k) (9)
Summing across firms and dividing by the number of workers Lt gives the time t average
minu as
1
Lt
nX
j=1
minujt = ut −
1
Lt
∞X
k=1
nX
j=1
skLjt−k(umt−k+1 − umt−k) (10)
= ut −
∞X
k=1
sk
Lt−k
Lt
(umt−k+1 − umt−k) (11)
Setting cjt = minujt in (5) and then using (9) and (11) in (5) gives a value for p lim bβ for
the minu case as
p lim bβminu ∝ − ∞X
k=1
sk(γk − γ0)(umt−k+1 − umt−k) (12)
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where γk = p lim scovf(Ljt−k, wjt) which - in keeping with the assumption of acyclical
firm employment and firm wages - is assumed to be time invariant and where we have used
the fact that in the absence of aggregate shocks p lim Lt−kLt = 1. Here and henceforth the
symbol ∝ means "positively proportional to".
Some of the models we consider below employ the log of firm employment rather than
its level. If (log) wages and firm employment are normally distributed 15 with time invariant
unconditional means and variances then cov(wjt, Ljt−k) = c+cov(wjt, ljt−k).where c+ > 0 and
is independent of k. Using this (12) becomes
p lim bβminu ∝ − ∞X
k=1
sk{γ∗k − γ∗0}(umt−k+1 − umt−k) (13)
where γ∗k = cov(ljt−k, wjt). k = 0, 1, 2, We will use (13) at various points below.
Now note that umt−k+1 − umt−k is always by definition non negative. We can see from (12)
therefore that if γ0 is always negative and if it is also larger than or equal in absolute value to
γk (for k = 1, 2, ..), then bβminu will be negative. If the γk (k > 0) are all weakly positive then
all we need is that γ0 be negative. By contrast if γ0 and γk are both positive then p lim bβminu
is only guaranteed to be negative if γk > γ0 for all k > 0, something that is unlikely to be
true.in practice or that is unlikely to be a theoretical property of a model. However, given
that s is below unity then the lead term may well dominate the sum in (12) or (13). In that
case we would require just γ1 > γ0. We could repeat these arguments for (13) and develop
identical conditions for γ∗k in place of γk.to determine the sign of p lim bβminu
4.3 Unemployment rate at start of tenure:- Su
For Su we could repeat the analytical steps used forminu but replacing terms in umt−k+1−umt−k
in (12) and (13) with ut−k+1 − ut−k. This gives the analogue form of (12) and (13) as
p lim bβSu ∝ − ∞X
k=1
sk(γk − γ0)(ut−k+1 − ut−k) (14)
p lim bβSu ∝ − ∞X
k=1
sk{γ∗k − γ∗0}(ut−k+1 − ut−k) (15)
Whereas umt−k+1−umt−k in (12) and (13) is always positive, the sign of ut−k+1−ut−k cannot
be determined so we cannot say anything definitive about the sign of bβSu.It is important to
15Of course employment has bounded support so technically speaking it can only be approximately nor-
mally distributed.
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note however that, for any given realisation of the unemployment rate sequence, p lim bβSu is
non zero16
4.4 Unemployment rate sensitivity of new hires:- ∂u
Setting cijt = ∂ijtut in (5) above and using cjt =
LjtX
i=1
∂ijtut = ut(Ljt− sLjt−1) in (5) gives the
analogues to (12) and (13) as
p lim bβδu ∝ −(sγ1 − γ0)ut (16)
p lim bβδu ∝ −(sγ∗1 − γ∗0)ut (17)
If γ0 is negative and γ1 is either relatively small in absolute value or is positive then bβδu
will have a negative probability limit. Once again these conditions apply to γ∗0 and γ
∗
1 . By
contrast if γ0 and γ1 are both positive and γ1 > γ0 than bβδu will have a negative probability
limit.
We now examine the implications for the signs of the estimates if there is heterogeneity
across firms in mean employment, wages and survival rates.
4.5 Heterogenous mean wages, mean firm employment and sur-
vival rates
Some of the theoretical equal treatment models we consider here generate negative cross
firm covariance between wages and size and as noted above this is in conflict with the wage
size premium. In addition and again as noted above, smaller, lower wage firms tend to
have lower survival rates.Here we extend the formulae for scov(wijt, cijt) given in (5) above
to allow for m sectors each containing nr r = 1..m firms with, respectively, survival rates
sr, average wages wrt and average firm employment L
r
t . These r sectors are assumed to
be separate subeconomies of the larger economy and under the assumption of no business
cycle in wages and employment their mean wages and employment, wr and L
r
.will be fixed
over time. To match the empirical regularities on s, w and L we assume that s = {s1..sm}
and w = {w1...wm} are increasing sequences. We do not require L = {L1....Lm} to be an
16It is possible that when we evaluate its unconditional mean, i.e.
1R
0
...
1R
0
p lim bβStartuf(u1, ...ut)du1du2..dut.
that this quantity could be zero. But for any particular realisation of the unemployment sequence it will be
non zero and of course it remains nonzero asymptotically as n− >∞.
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increasing sequence for our analytical results but it would be required to generate a positive
cross-sector size-wage premium, something we observe in the data. Finally we assume that
nr/n− > a nonzero constant as n− >∞ so that nr− >∞ with n.
In this scenario scov(wijt, cijt) becomes
scov(wijt, cijt) =
mX
r=1
prscovr(wijt, cijt) +
mX
r=1
pr(wrt − wt)(crt − ct) (18)
where scovr(.) denotes a sample covariance measured over the subsample of workers in
sector r and where pr is the proportion of the labour force in sector r at time t. For simplicity,
in the models we deal with below, we set m = 2 As long as sr (sector r0s survival rate)
monotonically increases with wrt .andm/n− > 0 as n− >∞ then the result in this subsection
readily extends to the m > 2 case.17
As before with m = 2 we can talk of "small, low wage, low s firms", and "large high
wage high s firms".unambiguously with annotations ”l”and ”h” respectively. Noting that
p lim(Lit−k/L
i
t) = 1 for i = l, h (no aggregate shocks to firm employment) we have exactly
the same situation as in Model B so that the p lim s of cit where c is δu,minu and Su are
respectively
p lim δu
i
t = (1− si)ut i = h, l
p limmit = (1− si)
∞X
k=0
ski u
m
t−k i = h, l
p limS
i
t = (1− si)
∞X
k=0
ski ut−k i = h, l
Reapplying the analysis in Model B above for the minu and δu cases we have that ,
sl < sh => cl > ch independently of L
l
, L
h
. Using this and the fact that wl < wh, we see
that the second summation term in (18) has a negative probability limit for these two UTI’s.
Hence a suﬃcient condition for p lim scov(wijt, cijt) to be negative in the minu and δu cases
is that p lim scovi(wijt, cijt) for i = l, h.. also be negative.
For Su however, these suﬃcient conditions do not apply:- even if we can determine the
sign of p lim scovi(wijt, cijt) in (18) we cannot determine the sign of the second.term.
17Proof available on request
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4.6 A digression:- Hagedorn andManovskii’s qHM and qEH variates
Hagedorn and Manovskii(2010 - henceforth HM) describe a search environment where work-
ers’ wages in a job are equal to a common cyclical wage (as would be the case under a simple
market clearing model without search) plus an idiosyncratic firm specific match component.
The latter is the workers’ unobserved firm specific human capital. HM argue that minu
and Su are significant in Mincer regressions because they proxy for this unobserved match
quality. They show that the expected number of job oﬀers a worker receives during his
working spell (a spell during which employment is continuous, in which the worker switches
firms only in response to higher oﬀers and which is terminated when he is laid oﬀ) explains
the wage in that work spell. In the version of their model with exogenous separations they
develop two variables that act as proxies for the idiosyncratic component of a worker’s wage.
Defining labour market tightness θt as the ratio of aggregate vacancies to the unemployment
rate, these two variates are qHM , the sum of θ0s during the current job spell and qEH the sum
of θ0s during the work spell up to the point the job started. HM argue that the significance
of minu and Su does not necessarily support the respective rigid wage contracting models
they were designed to test because these variates are also significant under HM’s flex wage
market clearing world. At first glance this appears to be similar to the point of our paper,
namely to show that minu and Su may be significant and "correctly" signed under polar
opposite models - ones that specify equal treatment - to those which motivated the respective
variate’s construction. However this is misleading. Our eﬀect arises not because the vari-
ates minu and Su proxy for worker specific elements of wages (as in HM) but because they
are correlated with firm level wage and employment policies. Furthermore, because HM’s
variates are - like minu and Su - partly constructed from tenure dummies that are corre-
lated with a firm’s wage and hiring policy under an equal treatment model with homogenous
workers, they too may be spuriously significant under such alternative models. If this was
the case HM’s variates would suﬀer the same fate as minu,etc in that their significance does
not necessarily support HM’s flex wage spot market model.but instead could arise under one
of the rigid wage equal treatment alternatives considered in this paper. To illustrate this
idea, we take a closer look at qHM and qEH under an equal treatment model market clearing
model with identical workers.
The equal treatment models we consider in this paper do not say anything about the
vacancy rate θ - it does not feature in them at all. However, below we derive all of our
analytical results for panels under the absence of a business cycle.in aggregate wages and
employment. Following this line for θt we specify it as a constant θ (say). Again this will
make our results stark by showing that apparently significant estimates of qHM and qEH
obtain even when θ is constant.It is endogenous tenure not unobserved human capital that
is at work here.
To follow HM to the letter we should examine the joint behaviour of qHM and qEH in a
wage regression. But to keep things simple and tractable we consider their probability limits
as single regressors separately. To compute (5) for the current case we will need to compute
the sum of qHM values across a firm’s workers at time t.(”cjt”) At time t workers of tenure
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k surviving a further m periods all have the same qHM value of (k +m)θ. As we have seen
already, the number of workers at time t with tenure k is equal to sk(Ljt−k − sLjt−k−1).The
proportion of these leaving the firm in m periods time is sm−1(1− s). Therefore the number
of tenure k workers leaving in t+m is sm−1(1− s)sk(Ljt−k − sLjt−k−1).Multiplying by their
common qHM value of (k +m)θ) gives (k+m)θ)sm−1(1− s)sk(Ljt−k − sLjt−k−1). Summing
this expression over all possible horizonsm = 1, 2... and all possible tenures k = 0, 1, 2.. gives
the firm’s total qHM value, cjt, as
cjt =
∞X
k=0
sk(k +
1
1− s)θ(Ljt−k − sLjt−k−1)
Substituting into (6c) gives
p lim bβqHM ∝ θ
Lt
∞X
k=0
sk(k +
1
1− s)
µ
γk − sγk+1 − γ0
Lt−k − sLt−k−1
Lt
¶
If the data are generated by an equal treatment model whereby a firm’s (or a sector’s)
wage covaries with its labour force, then bβqHM will be nonzero even in the absence of a
business cycle.
Using our assumption of no business cycle in wages and employment i.e. that Lt−k is
constant over time, then Lt−k−sLt−k−1Lt is equal to 1− s and p lim bβqHM simplifies to
p lim bβqHM ∝ θ
p limLt
∞X
k=0
sk(k +
1
1− s) (γk − sγk+1)−
θ
p limLt
γ0
1 + s
1− s
where again we have assumed that p lim γfk = γk independent of t If we further suppose
that the covariance between a firm’s (sector’s) wages and its current labour force is negative
(i.e. γ0 < 0) whilst covariances between its lagged labour force and it wages are zero
(i.e. γk = 0 k = 1, 2, 3..).then p lim bβqHM is positively proportional to −s1−sγ0 and is hence
positive.Below we present some models which have covariances with this property.By contrast
if γ0 and γ1are positive with γk = 0 for k > 1 and where γ1 >
γ0
1−s then p lim
bβqHM is positive.
Below in subsection 5.2 we present a dynamic model of labour demand which is capable of
generating covariances with this property.(although we would never argue the property was
generic in any sense).
For qEH things are more tricky. This requires data on the length of the current job spell
when a worker joined the firm and this is not a variable that enters the models in our paper.
Furthermore and unlike labour market tightness, abstracting from the business cycle does
not help much. Even without cyclical variation in wages and employment, there could be
systematic time variation in the average length of measured job spells across time. Denoting
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τtjk as the average job spell length on joining firm j of workers of tenure k, the formula forbβqEH is a simple adaptation of the formula for Su (14) and is given as
bβqEH ∝ − ∞X
k=1
sk(γk − γ0)(τtjk−1 − τtjk)
Without knowing the sign of (τtjk−1− τtjk) we cannot determine the sign of bβqEH . but it
will in general be non zero.
In sum it is possible that HM’s qHM and qEH be significant and "correctly" (positively)
signed even tough the true world is radically diﬀerent to the one they specify namely, a world
without human capital or a business cycle in either wages, employment or unemployment.
4.7 Pooled estimation on a full panel dataset
We now show how the above results for bβ carry over from a single cross section (single time
period) to a full panel. We take the absence of a business cycle in firm employment and
wages to imply that for a worker i in firm j
wijt = f(fξjt) and Ljt = f(fξjt) (19)
where fξjt is a vector of firm specific idiosyncratic shocks with time invariant pdf’s.
Proposition 2:-
if p lim{scov(wijt, cijt)} < 0 t = 1, ..T then (20)
p lim{scovp(wijt, cijt)} < 0 (21)
where scovp(.) denotes a sample covariance derived from a panel and scov(.) denotes one
taken from a single cross section.
Proof:- See Appendix
In the absence of aggregate shocks to firm wages and employment then, if bβ has a negative
probability limit in the cross section it also has a negative limit in the entire panel. Therefore
if the suﬃcient conditions on γk(γ∗k) for (asymptotic) negativity of bβ discussed in subsections
4.2,4.3 and 4.4 above hold in both the high and low sectors, separately this is all we need
consider. Later we will examine some equal treatment models to assess whether or not they
generate cross firm wage-employment covariances that satisfy these suﬃcient conditions.
Before then we turn to analyse the eﬀects of random sampling on our results.
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4.8 The eﬀects of using a random sample
Until now we have assumed that we have a complete dataset of all the workers in an economy
with a large number of firms. But investigators typically only have access to a random
subsample.of a particular population (a remarkable exception is the QPdataset in the case
of Portugal). The eﬀects of random sampling adds technicalities but provided that the
number of firms being sampled remains large the probability limits of the estimates are
unchanged.
Suppose we have a random sample consisting of a proportion ρjt of firm j0s workforce at
time t where ρjt equals a constant ρ > 0 plus an independently distributed finite variance
shock εjt. so that
Lρjt−k = ρLjt−k + εjt−kLjt−k and (22)
Lρt = ρLt +
nX
j=1
εjtLjt (23)
where here and henceforth superscript "ρ” denotes a quantity from a random sample so that
Lρjt−k{L
ρ
t} are the number of workers sampled ex post from firm j at time t− k{t}.18.
Proposition 3:- The asymptotic quantities computed in this paper for the
entire population of workers in n firms are unchanged if we have instead a random
sample with properties given in(22) and (23)
Proof:- See Appendix
5 Wage setting in models of equal treatment
In this section we examine what the above results imply under some equal treatment con-
tracting models. We follow the theory above and work in a world where aggregate shocks and
hence an aggregate business cycle do not exist. Here firm or sector wages and employment
depend only on idiosyncratic shocks and we try and establish the sign of p lim bβminuetc under
these assumptions.We deal with firm "productivity" shocks below. and we take this to imply
any shock aﬀecting the productivity of labour within the firm. whether they arise from real
18We note four things. First, we should more formally write Lrjt−k = int(ρjt−kLjt−k) where int denotes
integer truncation but doing so changes nothing so we suppress this for brevity.Second, our assumptoins on
ε do not rule out ρjt = 0 for some firm j - the crucial assumption is that its mean ρ is strictly positve and
constant and remains so as n− > ∞. Third wjt is written without a ρ superscript because it pertains to
firm j and is not changed by random sampling. Finally allowing ρjt to be stochastic means that the sample
is not stratified with respect to firms but obvioulsy the stratified case - where the variance of errors goes to
zero, is encompassed here.
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(e.g. technological) or nominal (e.g. monetary) sources. However given that nominal shocks
are highly unlikely to be idiosyncratic (although it is conceivable that monetary shocks im-
pact diﬀerent firms/sectors in idiosyncratic ways) a real interpretation to these shocks is
preferred here. In the numerical simulations where aggregate shocks are re-admitted, both
real and nominal sources are relevant.
5.1 Static models: Market clearing
Market clearing or the spot market model is perhaps the archetypal equal treatment model.
For the current purpose we consider a number of segmented labour markets j = 1, ...n
rather than a group of firms. Labour mobility costs between sectors are assumed to be
prohibitively high.and each sector may include a number of identical firms.but in that case
we interpret the sectoral labour demand schedule as an aggregation of (or an approximation
to the aggregation of) the schedules of each firm within the sector.
Of course the number of sectors. n in this context is likely to be small, certainly relative
to the case where it denotes firms so we should interpret asymptotic results with caution.
Numerical simulations below give exact results for bβ under particular parameter calibrations.
A simple static supply/demand schedule for labour in sector j could be
wijt = wjt = K + ξjt − αljt Inverse labour demand (24)
lijt = ljt = L+ πξjt + ujt Labour sup ply (25)
where π and α are positive parameters, ξjt is a sector specific productivity shock and. ujt
is an exogenous shock to sectoral labour supply which could be interpreted as a preference
shock..Note that the labour supply equation does not include the wage.but instead has
agents reacting to temporary productivity shocks. This is consistent with intertemporal
labour supply behaviour that might be embodied in a standard RBC model say. It is easy
to see that
γ∗0 = πσ
2
ξ − α(π2σ2ξ + σ2u) γ∗k = 0 k > 0
γ∗0 < 0 when
π
α
− π2 < σ
2
u
σ2ξ
From the arguments above if γ∗0 < 0, then p lim bβminu.and p lim bβδu < 0.As before, we
cannot be as definitive about the sign of p lim bβSu. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for
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γ∗0 < 0 is that
π
α−π2 <
σ2u
σ2ξ
. For any given value of σ
2
u
σ2ξ
, the smaller is πα−π2, the more likely it
is that this inequality is satisfied. Estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply,
π here, tend to be very small. For example using micro data Altoni(1986) finds values below
0.35. Estimates of (the absolute value of) sectoral wage elasticities of labour demand (the
inverse of α) vary but are typically less than unity. For example Estavao and Wilson (1998)
again using micro data find values in the range 0.1 to 0.8. Noting that πα −π2 decreases with
α and is maximised at π = 1
2α , we could ask the question, "given these empirical estimates,
what is the largest reasonable value πα −π2 could take?" To answer this take a value for α at
the bottom of Estavao and Wilson’s range -. 1.4 say - and then maximise πα − π2 by setting
π to 0.35 (coincidentally at the top of Altoni’s range). The corresponding maximum value
of πα − π2 is 0.13. In sum, given the empirical evidence, the strictest requirement on
σ2u
σ2ξ
that
would guarantee γ∗0 < 0 is that the preference shock variance, σ
2
u must exceed 13% of the
productivity shock variance.σ2u This requirement does not seem strict or unreasonable.
Finally, we have focused on γ∗0 < 0 as a likely prediction of this model which could be
interpreted as implying a negative wage size premium. To generate the empirically observed
positive wage-size premium we could easily adapt the model along the lines of Model B
above and split the sectors into two sub-economies. The sub-economies could have identi-
cal stochastic structure but the "low"("high") sub-economy would have high(low) expected
wages, high(low) survival rates and large(small) expected employment respectively in each
of its constituent sectors. In the context of the notation above, K, L and s would each be
indexed with i = l, h for the two sub-economies in order to accommodate the diﬀerent means
in sector wages and employment and the diﬀerent survival rates as required. As before we
can apply the conditions given in subsections 4.2,4.3 and 4.4 for negativity of p lim bβminu and
p lim bβδuto the γ0ks of each sub-economy intact.
Analysis of a static monopsonistic model - which would follow along similar lines - is a
special case of the dynamic monopsony model in the next section
5.2 Dynamic models:- Adjustment costs under monopsony and
competition
Here we analyse a model that is capable of producing a positive wage-size premium with-
out using the "big-small/high-low wage" sub-economies constructed above (although such a
structure may be "bolted on" if so required). We allow for dynamic adjustment costs in a)
a model of many firms in n separate and perfectly competitive labour markets (sectors) and
in b) a model of n monopsonistic firms. Whilst the two models generate identical time series
representations for aggregate employment and wages (namely a VARMA(1,0) for labour and
VARMA(1,1) for wages).the monopsony version is easier to solve and present so we make
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this our main case.and state at the end how competition changes the results 19.
Suppose that each firm j has period t profits given by
πjt = {aLjt − bL2jt + 2ξjtLjt}− c{Ljt − sLjt−1}2 − wjtLjt (26)
where ξjt is an idiosyncratic additive productivity shock to firm j0s marginal product
of labour. The first term in braces in (26) is the value of output and if b 6= 0 there will
be diminishing returns. The second term in braces is the (quadratic) cost of recruiting,
accommodating and training new hires. 20 All coeﬃcients are strictly positive. Suppose that
(mean) labour supply to the firm is unit elastic and is given by
Ljt = wjt + 2ujt (27)
where ujt is a firm specific white noise labour supply (preference) shock independent of
ξjt. For tractability we assume that firms maximise discounted expected profits with discount
rate δ. The Euler condition governing optimal firm labour demand is (ignoring intercepts)
Ljt = ΨLjt−1 + δΨEtLjt+1 +
Ψ
cs
{ξjt + ujt} (28)
where Ψ = cs
1+b+c+δcs2 . and where we assume b, c, s and δ are such that Ψ−
1
2δ
1
2
< 0.21 The
solution for Ljt is
Ljt = λLjt−1 +
λ
cs
{ξjt + ujt} (29)
where λ is the stable, positive root of the quadratic implicit in λ{= Ψ
1−δΨλ} = cs1+b+c+δcs(s−λ) .
Using (27) to eliminate Ljt and Ljt−1in (29) gives the reduced form for the firm’s wages as
wjt = λwjt−1 +
λ− 2cs
cs
ujt + 2λujt−1 +
λ
cs
ξjt (30)
If we use γ+k to denote cov(wjtLjt−1) and σ
2
z to denote var(z) then (28) and (29) imply
that
19Of course as noted by Manning (2003) and others monopsony and dynamic labour adjustment costs
both act to drive a wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage
20Note that as new hires are always positive here, this term cannot represent firing costs.Also note that
our adjustment term diﬀers from the more traditional {Lijt − Lijt−1}2 because we have an exogenous quit
rate here (1− s).
21This is a weak requirement that is more likely to be satisfied as b grows. But even if b is close to zero
we would still only need 1s + δs > 2δ
1
2 - with δ and s around .98 and .7 respectively this is easily satsified.
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γ+0 = σ
2
L − 2τσ2u (31)
γ+k = λ
kσ2L k > 0 (32)
where σ2L =
τ 2
1− λ2 (σ
2
u + σ
2
ξ ) and where τ =
λ
cs
< 1 (33)
To assess the sign of p lim bβ for the three UTI’s is not straightforward because w is in
levels whilst up until now we have only measured wages as logs. We should note that the
analysis in section 4 above could be applied directly to the case where the regressand is
wijt rather than wijt but empirical analyses nearly always use the log of wages not levels.
Invoking similar arguments to those made below equation (12), if wijt and Lijt−k are joint
normal 22 with time invariant unconditional means and variances then we can easily show 23
that γk = cwγ+k where cw is a fixed positive multiplier. In this case, the sign of terms such
as γ1 − γ0 (which determines the sign of p lim bβδu as (16) above shows) can be checked by
examining the sign of γ+1 − γ+0 .
Firstly note that if σ2L < τσ
2
u then γ
+
0 < 0 and because γ
+
k > 0 for all k > 0 then
p lim bβminu will be negative as (12) and the arguments in the paragraph below it show. The
same arguments apply to p lim bβδu.But the sign of p lim bβSu.remains - as before - ambiguous.
In the other part of the parameter space where σ2L > τσ
2
u i.e. where γ
+
0 > 0, the model
generates a positive wage size premium without recourse to the high/low subeconomy device.
However, here results are not so definitive. Starting with p lim bβδu, its sign will hinge on the
sign of the term γ+1 − γ+0 . (see (16) above). For the latter to hold and for us to be in the
σ2L > τσ
2
u/γ
+
0 > 0 scenario we require
2(1− λ) < ( τ
1 + λ
)(1 + r) < 2 (34)
where the leftmost inequality ensures we are in the γ+0 > 0 scenario (the γ
+
0 < 0 scenario we
dealt with already above) and where the rightmost inequality ensures γ+1 −γ+0 > 0. The model
is linear and aggregates across the entire economy making λ the autoregressive coeﬃcient in
wages and - assuming a fixed labour force - also in unemployment rates. Using annual data
on aggregate unemployment from the BLS from the last 25 years gives an estimate of λ of
about.6. Empirically credible calibration values would therefore be λ = .6, a survival rate
(s) of .7 and discount rate (δ) of .98. The extent of diminishing returns governed by b is
hard to calibrate however so we set it to zero and assume constant returns..Unfortunately
these parameter values imply that c is about 10 which in turn means that in the steady
state labour turnover costs would be 90% of the total wage bill. This seems far too high.
22More properly we should say approximnately joint normal because W and L have bounded support.
23To show the relationship between γk and γ+k , expand log(Wjt) around E(Wjt) and then apply Isserlis’
theorem to the expected value of each term in the expansion multiplied by {Ljt−k −E(Ljt−k)}.
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For example Mincer (1989) finds estimates of job training expenditures nearer to 10% of the
total compensation bill rather than 90%. A compromise would be to set λ = .5, s = .8 and
δ (again) to .98. This implies a value of c of about 2 and equilibrium labour turnover costs
around 8% of the wage bill. Under these settings (34) requires that ( σξσu ) must exceed 1.9 (to
be in the γ+0 > 0 scenario) and be below 2.9 (to ensure γ
+
1 − γ+0 > 0).24.
For p lim bβminu the lead term in (12) - s(γ+1 − γ+0 )(ut − umt−1) - may dominate the sum
in downswings where ut > umt−1 but in upswings the term is zero. We examine the signs of
the p lim0 s of the UTI coeﬃcients under various specific parameter scenarios in numerical
simulations below.
The above analysis can be adapted to the perfectly competitive case almost intact.
Rewriting (26) for a firm i in sector j and using (27) to define sector j0s labour supply
curve we can solve for sector j0s aggregate employment and get a form identical to (29) ex-
cept now λ is (implicitly given as) the solution to λ = csb+c+csδ(s−λ)+1/2 . In this model however
- as opposed to the case of monopsony above - c is now hard to interpret/calibrate. In the
monopsony model c was the weight on the square of new hires. This in turn is directly related
to the square of the firm’s employment which is just the firm’s wage bill. To make the same
link here between the firm’s wage bill and the square of new hires we would need the firm’s
share of sector j employment.- which of course is arbitrary here. We could however calibrate
λ, δ and s as before and not attempt to interpret the implied value of c. This at least gives
us the luxury of setting λ, δ and s to our preferred values of .6, .98 and .7 respectively. At
these values, cs = 3.5 and τ = .2 and applying (34) again requires ( σξσu ) - which now pertains
to sectoral productivity and sectoral labour supply shocks rather than those of a firm - to
exceed 2.3 (for the γ+0 > 0 scenario) but to be below 3.9 (to ensure γ
+
1 − γ+0 > 0). Of course
if σξσu < 2.3 we get the γ
+
0 < 0 scenario and in this scenario as before p lim bβδu.and p lim bβminu
will both be negative whilst p lim bβSu will have ambiguous sign.
Although some of the cases above correspond to a negative wage size premium we could
arrange the n firms/sectors into two "sub-economies" corresponding to high and low mean
wage, mean firm employment and survival rates respectively. The sub-economies could have
the same stochastic structure but s and the "intercepts" (suppressed in the analysis above)
which govern mean wages and employment would diﬀer. This device would generate a
positive wage size premium.whilst keeping intact the suﬃcient conditions for negativity of
the UTI’s we have just established.
24Both shocks are scaled in terms of units of labour so the ratio of their standard deviations is scale free.
The second requirement therefore translates to saying that the standard deviation of productivity shocks
should be less than treble those of "preference" shocks to labour supply.
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5.3 Martins, Snell and Thomas’ equal treatment contracting mod-
els
Martins, Snell and Thomas(2005 and 2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) develop equal
treatment contracting models where firms smooth the wages of risk averse workers. Firms
are always on their MPL schedules and wages are smoothed nonlinear functions of current
and past productivity shocks. Under a constant plus shock formulation for productivity,
equilibrium wages are given by
wjt = max{−κ+ wjt−1 − π(ξjt − ξjt−1), ξjt} (35)
where κ > 0 and π > 0 are constants that depend on workers’ relative risk aversion and on
the curvature of the production function.Given this wage policy, firms then set employment
such that wage equals MPL, which we assume is given by (24) above. Heuristically, the
properties of wages in equilibrium are that when there is sharp negative productivity shock,
employment is cut (there is positive unemployment) and subsequently wages fall gradually
towards the market clearing level. If there is a large enough positive productivity shock before
wages have completed their adjustment down to the level required for full employment, jumps
immediately to clear the labour market and wages adjust immediately to the new high level
of productivity.
Using the MPL condition (24) we can deduce that the γ∗k. must obey
γ∗0 = −αvar(ljt) + cov(ljt, ξjt) (36)
γ∗k = −αcov(ljt, ljt−k) (37)
As noted above we cannot solve for or analytically sign the quantities in (36) and (37).
InMartins, Snell and Thomas (2010) a far simpler version of this model is presented.where
real wages are assumed to be downwardly rigid. In that, the maximum amount per period
they can fall is exogenously bounded. An example would be an exogenous nominal wage
rigidity constraint whereby the maximum rate of real wage decline in any period is given by
the inflation rate. The two equations describing wage-price dynamics are the MPL condition
(??) and, under a linear in shocks productivity formulation, the wage rule
wjt = max{ξjt, µwjt−1} (38)
where µ ≤ 1. Following a large negative productivity shock, wages fall only slowly to
the new market clearing level at a rate determined by µ which is assumed to be exogenous.
Again, analytical results for the panel case are hard to obtain
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Because the second model is simpler and has very few parameters we examine the sign ofbβ using numerical simulations.on data generated under this model rather than the first. In
the simulations we again split the economy into two sub-economies with high and low mean
employment, wage and survival rates respectively.
6 Some numerical simulations
Here we analyse the values of bβ from calibrated versions of the dynamic competition model,
which we call DCM (although equally we could refer to this as the dynamic monopsony
model as it has an identical stochastic structure) and the Martins, Snell and Thomas model
which we call MST. Unlike the analysis above these models will have aggregate shocks in
them. The main purpose here is to be indicative rather than exhaustive. We wish to show
that under reasonable parameter values these equal treatment models can generate numerical
values for the coeﬃcients of the same order of magnitude as those found in the empirical
literature.
The MST and DCM models do not have firms but sectors (although if we interpret the
DCM model as one of monopsony, the sectors would be considered as being firms). Sectors
are presumed to be segmented labour markets. Whilst it is not clear how many such labour
markets exist in any economy, their number will be an order of magnitude lower than that of
firms. In the face of this uncertainty we run simulations for numbers of sectors ns = 9,21.and
51 The number of years, T , in the panel is set to 5,10 and 20 - typical spans for many US
panel data studies.
The MST Model.
For the MST model we adopt a more general firm productivity process than before, one
that includes both idiosyncratic (firm or sector specific) and aggregate shocks, namely
ξjt = φt+ εjt + τt (39)
τt = τt−1 + t (40)
where εjt and t are iid normally distributed firm specific and aggregate (log) productivity
shocks with variances σ2ε and σ
2
 respectively and where .ξjt is the log of the total factor
productivity (TFP) of sector j at time t. Given this productivity process, MST will generate
genuine business cycles in wages and unemployment.
Unfortunately there is no data on sectoral TFP for the MST model to help us calibrate
values for σ2ε . However the BLS does produce TFP estimates for 20 or so manufacturing
sectors. The postwar standard deviations of TFP growth in these sectors lie between 2
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and 5% - substantially higher than that for aggregate TFP as one might expect.given that
the sectors will in part be driven by idiosyncratic elements. We therefore run two sets of
simulations with σε = .02 and σε = .05.respectively. This should give us an idea of how E(bβ)
changes with idiosyncratic TFP volatility. When n is large, idiosyncratic shocks will wash
out and the standard deviation of aggregate productivity growth will be σ In postwar annual
US data, this quantity is roughly .017. By setting σε.to .015 we get a standard deviation of
aggregate productivity growth slightly below .017 for large n and slightly above for small n.
The parameter α, the inverse of the firm/sector wage elasticity of labour demand is set to 1.4,
roughly in line with results from studies of labour demand using postwar US data. For MST,
µ, the extent to which real wages can fall within any year we set to .97. If inflation stands
at 3% per annum - close to the postwar US average - than this setting implies nominal wage
resistance (for a recent model of nominal wage resistance see Elsby, 2010). The trend term φ
is set to .01 implying 1% per year growth in real wages. Finally for the MST model we have
two separate scenarios:- the first has a single economy with homogenous sectoral means and
survival rates and the second allocates the sectors into "high" and "low" sub-economies as
per Model B. In the latter exercise, sectors in the "high" sub-economy have twice the mean
employment and 5% higher wages than the "low" sub economy.and the survival rates for
each sub-economy were .8 and .6 respectively We kept the total size of each subeconomy
equal by allowing the "low" sub-economy to have twice as many sectors as the "high". In
each simulation the wage-size premium is about 5% in keeping with elasticities estimated in
the empirical literature.
The DCM Model
The DCM model is intrinsically a "deviations from trend" model. Here we assume that
productivity is the sum of temporary idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks which have no
deterministic trend We assume that each sector has common (aggregate) productivity shock
ξt and an idiosyncratic exogenous sectoral labour supply.shock ujt. The standard deviations
of the former is σξ = .025 and the standard deviation of the latter is set at a level that
makes the standard deviation of aggregate (detrended) employment equal to 2% - roughly
in line with postwar US data. λ - the autoregressive coeﬃcient is set to .6 again in line with
postwar aggregate employment data.
The Simulation Results
We derive average values for bβminu,. bβSu, and bβ∂u using 1000 simulations for each model
and parameter set. We add one further estimate bβδhu which uses the de-meaned aggregate
unemployment rate ut −
ST
t=1 ut
T to construct δu rather than the unemployment level itself.
We do this because we believe it is a more satisfactory way of modeling the impact of
unemployment on wages. In keeping with the empirical literature we include a linear tenure
term in all regressions and for the bβδu case we add the aggregate unemployment rate as an
extra regressor.
Results for the MST model under a single economy (Table 1) and two sub-economies
(Table 2) and for the DCM model (Table 3) are given below
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Table 1
Estimates of E(bβ) for the MST Model
σε = .02 σε = .05bβminu bβδu bβδhu bβSu bβminu bβδu bβδhu bβSu
ns = 9, T = 5 −2.05 −1.82 −2.50 −.43 −.57 −.29 −.71 −.13
ns = 21, T = 5 −2.42 −2.07 −2.95 −.51 −.64 −.23 −.61 −.10
ns = 51, T = 5 −3.44 −2.88 −4.46 −.66 −.65 −.22 −.70 −.13
ns = 9, T = 9 −2.12 −1.88 −2.36 −.49 −.63 −.29 −.63 −.17
ns = 21, T = 9 −3.06 −2.54 −3.48 −.70 −.63 −.22 −.60 −.14
ns = 51, T = 9 −3.28 −2.39 −3.39 −.85 −.86 −.22 −.77 −.21
ns = 9, T = 20 −1.98 −1.57 −1.95 −.77 −.50 −.20 −.37 −.15
ns = 21, T = 20 −2.77 −2.13 −2.82 −.90 −.75 −.20 −.50 −.22
ns = 51, T = 20 −3.30 −2.32 −3.15 −1.09
Table 2
Estimates of E(bβ) for the MST Model with high/low sub-economies
σε = .02 σε = .05bβminu bβδu bβδhu bβSu bβminu bβδu bβδhu bβSu
ns = 10, T = 5 −2.11 −2.16 −.83 −.45 −1.06 −.79 −.87 −.12
ns = 20, T = 5 −3.61 −3.46 −2.11 −.59 −.99 −.73 −.88 −.12
ns = 50, T = 5 −4.79 −4.69 −3.02 −.61 −.96 −.75 −.74 −.11
ns = 10, T = 10 −3.35 −3.10 −2.30 −.69 −.79 −.55 −.51 −.14
ns = 20, T = 10 −4.16 −3.80 −3.10 −.75 −1.03 −.65 −.70 −.19
ns = 50, T = 10 −5.12 −4.74 −3.62 −.79 −1.33 −.77 −.89 −.24
ns = 10, T = 20 −3.20 −2.92 −2.27 −.80 −.88 −.55 −.45 −.16
ns = 20, T = 20 −4.09 −3.52 −2.92 −.99 −1.18 −.62 −.58 −.22
ns = 50, T = 20 −5.44 −4.64 −3.95 −1.34 −1.41 −.77 −.72 −.26
Table 3
Estimates of E(bβ) for the DMC Model
DMC bβminu bβδu bβδhu bβSu
σu = .02 σu = .01
ns = 9, T = 5 −.997 −.008 −.128 −.302
ns = 21, T = 5 −.963 −.007 −.100 −.286
ns = 51, T = 5 −.978 −.007 −.112 −.296
ns = 9, T = 10 −.913 −.007 −.145 −.318
ns = 21, T = 10 −.947 −.009 −.151 −.330
ns = 51, T = 10 −.991 −.008 −.153 −.328
ns = 9, T = 20 −.923 −.012 −.184 −.387
ns = 21, T = 20 −.966 −.012 −.180 −.390
ns = 51, T = 20 −.988 −.012 −.187 −.412
We see that all estimates have a negative sign In terms of magnitude the minu and Su
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estimates in MST for low idiosyncratic variance are similar to those obtained by BDN. The
estimates of δu in this scenario are higher in absolute value than empirical counterparts.
MST estimates from the high σε case are in line with empirical counterparts for Su and δu
but those for minu are a bit low.compared with the values found in the empirical literature.
DCM seems to produce estimates for Su that are broadly in line with empirical work but
the results for minu and δu are lower than that typically found.
7 Extending SBP’ method to handle unmatched datasets
The problem of bias we have identified in this paper has its root in firm (or sector) specific
components of the wage that are related to firm (or sector) hiring levels. As noted above
we could remove these by adding firm-year interaction dummies to the panel regression.
Under an equal treatment model as laid out in (2) this would reduce the regressand wijt to
idiosyncratic noise whereas under the hypothesis that wages are linear in cijt the addition
of such dummy terms is innocuous. But what if the dataset does not match workers to
firms? Large matched panel datasets abound in Europe but in the US they are virtually
non-existent. In this section we tentatively oﬀer a solution to the bias which is implementable
in unmatched datasets. Conceptually, the solution is considerably inferior to the addition
of firm-year interaction terms and will only work if cross firm wage-employment covariances
are constant over time.
SBP point out that in a panel data set, macro variates like unemployment, have extremely
limited variation. For example, adding the aggregate unemployment rate to a Mincer equa-
tion in the PSID involves dealing with a regressor that takes on <50 diﬀerent values to
explain wages which take on around a million diﬀerent values. As Moulton(1986) shows,
this is likely to impart huge bias to standard errors because of error clustering. SBP’s solu-
tion was to use the panel dimension to control for worker characteristics and extract from
the panel "composition bias free" estimates of mean wages at each time t via the addition
to the Mincer equation of time dummies. Coeﬃcients on these dummies - common time
eﬀects in wages - would then be regressed on unemployment and other macro series of in-
terest in a time series regression. In an extension of this idea to minu and Su, Devereux
and Hart(2007) add tenure-year interaction dummies to extract composition bias free esti-
mates of average wages within each tenure-year cell of the panel data. Minu and Su only
vary between tenure-year cells and are constant for workers within these cells.So again the
idea is to condense the data to guarantee that the "x-variable" varies between each data
point. Finally Shin and Shin(2003) extract time means of respectively, stayers’ and movers’
wages to estimate diﬀerential eﬀects of unemployment on new hires and incumbent wages
via separate time series regressions. We show below that these aggregation methods do not
remove the bias we have identified in this paper but they do point to a possible way forward
to remove it.
Again and without loss of generality, we abstract from worker characteristics so we can
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focus on raw mean wages. In this section we operate under the hypothesis of equal treatment
as written in equations (2) and (4) above. We maintain the Model A plus Model B struc-
ture above where there are "high"/"low firms with high/low mean wages, high/low mean
employment and high/low survival rate and where each firm is subject to aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks. Under this scenario the tenure k time t average (log) wage is
wkt =
nhP
j=1
skh(L
h
jt−k − shLhjt−k−1)whjt +
nlP
j=1
skl (L
l
jt−k − slLljt−k−1)wljt
nhP
j=1
skh(L
h
jt−k − shLhjt−k−1) +
nlP
j=1
skl (L
l
jt−k − slLljt−k−1)
(41)
where Lijt−k i = h, l is employment in a firm j at time t − k that is located in the i
sector and where ni i = h, l is the number of firms in sector i..assumed fixed over time.
Defining the proportion of firms in the high/low sectors as a fixed constant pi = n
i
n , dividing
the top and bottom of (41) by n and taking probability limits as the ni both go to infinity
gives p limwkt (= µk,t) as
µk,t( = p limwkt ) =
A
C
+
B
C
(42)
where A = phskh(γ
h
k,t − shγhk+1,t) + plskl (γlk,t − slγlk+1,t)
B = phµht s
k
h(L
h
t−k − shL
h
t−k−1) + p
lµlts
k
l (L
l
t−k − slL
l
t−k−1)
C = phskh(L
h
t−k − shL
h
t−k−1) + p
lskl (L
l
t−k − slL
l
t−k−1)
where µit =
Sni
j=1 w
i
jt
ni and L
h
t−k are the (unweighted) average firm wage at t and firm
employment(size) at t− k in the i sector.respectively and where γik,t is the probability limit
of the sample covariance of Ljt−k and wjt. We make two further simplifying assumptions.
First we assume that L
l
t−k = ρL
h
t−k (ρ < 1) i.e. that employment in the high and low sectors
has common cyclicality.25 Second we assume that the normalised covariances γi∗k,t =
γik,t
L
i
t−kµ
i
t
are constant over time and henceforth drop the t subscript. Under these assumptions (42)
takes the form
25This assumption would hold true if each firm’s employment was linear in idiosyncratic shocks and in
aggregate shocks.with the latter entering with coeﬃcient α(ρα) in high(low) firms. We should note that
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, (2008) find that "high" firms (large firms with high average wages) have more
cyclical employment than do "low" firms. We make the assumption of common cyclicality to simplify matters
but it shouild be clear from the discussion that greater cyclicality of high firms would make our results even
more pronounced.
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µk,t = µht +
ak − ak+1∆kt − (bk − bk+1∆kt)wpt
ck − ck+1∆kt
(43)
where ak = p
hskhγ
h∗
k + ρp
lskl γ
l∗
k ck = p
hskh + ρp
lskl and bk = ρp
lskl
where ∆kt = L
h
t−k−1/L
h
t−k. Under a constant or slow moving labour supply, ∆kt is approx-
imately one plus the change in the aggregate unemployment rate at time t − k.and as it
only enters tenure k0s cell mean it is the same as the change in the "start unemployment
rate". Equation (43) shows that under equal treatment, average wages in the tenure-year
cells µk,t will, in general, vary with tenure and time. In fact even if wages were fixed.(γi∗k = 0
and µit = µ).as long as employment was cyclical, cell mean wages would still display cyclical
variation over time and tenure. The SBP method26 uses wkt to estimate µ
h
k,t. We then regress
wkt (which form a balanced panel dataset) on the relevant cell value of the UTI, ckt say. In
the case of δu, k takes the value 0 for new hires and 1 for all other tenures (incumbents)
and there are two regressors; δukt and ut. We consider the consequences of using the SBP
method for each of our three UTI’s in turn.
a) Su : − Equation (42) shows that µhk,t will be related to the change in start unemploy-
ment. Hence Su will be significant both under bilateral contracting of the Su variety.and
when there is equal treatment.
b) minu : − Again problems arise here because of potential comovement of minu with
wkt over t and k.To give a specific and simple example we could return temporarily to the
base scenario of this paper and suppose that aggregate shocks are absent so that mean
wages and mean firm employment at time t are constant over time27. Economic models of
wage determination lead us to expect that the |γh∗k | will decline with k albeit not necessarily
monotically 28. Equally we know thatminu will decline with k although again not necessarily
monotonically. If the γhk,t are predominantly negative we would expect a spuriously negative
coeﬃcient in the regression of wkt on the t, k.cell minu.
c) δu : − The SBP method has been used several times in the empirical literature to
estimate the diﬀerential response of new hire wages to unemployment so we now flesh out
more explicit results for this case.
The mean wage of incumbents (µIt) is
26More properly its extension in Devereux and Hart (2007).
27As before we would require aggregate labour supply to vary over time in order to avoid a constant
aggregate unemployment rate).
28In dynamic models, the γ0ks will be non zero because current and lagged idiosyncratic shocks aﬀect firm
wages and firm employment. These models usually embed stationarity garanteeing that the γ0s− > 0 with
k.
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µIt = p lim
nhP
j=1
shLhjt−1w
h
jt +
nlP
j=1
slLljt−1w
l
jt
nhP
j=1
shLhjt−1 +
nlP
j=1
slLljt−1
=
shγh1,t + slγ
l
1,t
(sh + ρ∗sl)L
h
t−1
+
shµht + slρ
∗µlt
sh + ρ∗sl
= µht +
shγh∗1 µ
h
t + slγ
l∗
1 µ
l
t
sh + ρ∗sl
+
slρ∗
sh + ρ∗sl
wpt (44)
where ρ∗ = ρpl/ph is the ratio of the number of workers in low firms to those in high
firms in the economy as a whole
Adapting (42) with k = 0 to get the corresponding case for new hires gives
µ0t = µht +
a0 − a1∆kt − (b0 − b1∆0t)wpt
c0 − c1∆0t
(45)
Equations (44) and (45) show that the mean incumbent and new hire wages are both
weighted averages of the µ0ts but the former has fixed weights whereas the latter has weights
that vary with∆0t. An interesting special case is where wages in firms are acyclical - constant
to make this an extreme case - but where aggregate employment is cyclical. Linearising the
second term in (45) around ∆0t = 1 we can rewrite (45) as
µ0t ≈ cons tan t−
ρ∗(sh − sl)wp
(1− sh + ρ∗(1− sl))2
(∆0t − 1) = α+ β∆t−1 (46)
where β < 0. As noted above ∆0t − 1 is approximately the change in the aggregate
unemployment rate. Unlike µIt therefore, µ0t would appear to be procyclical and regressing
{µIt,µ0t} on the aggregate unemployment rate and a new hire dummy times the unem-
ployment rate (δU) would yield a zero coeﬃcient on the former but a spuriously negative
coeﬃcient on the latter.29
As a final note and in contrast to the above, if we again assume common cyclicality of
employment in the high and low sectors, we can show that wages averaged over all workers
at time t (µt) do not display spurious cyclicality under a null of equal treatment. Using
L
l
t−k = ρL
h
t−k, k = 0, 1, 2.. and following familiar arithmetic manipulations it is easy to show
that µt is given by
µt =
1
1 + ρ∗
(1 + γ∗h0 )µ
h
t +
ρ∗
1 + ρ∗
(1 + γ∗l0 )µ
l
t (47)
29This is a relatively simple result to derive and proof is available on request.
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where 1
1+ρ∗ and where
ρ∗
1+ρ∗ are proportions of the workforce in low and high firms re-
spectively. Hence, whilst (42) to (46) show how mean wages at time t for tenure k will in
general display spurious cyclicality and spurious tenure eﬀects (47) shows that - under our
simplifying assumptions,- average wages across all workers (tenures) at time t will not. If
T was large the investigator could regress composition bias free estimates of µt on cijt. (to
capture the alternative hypothesis) and on presumed determinants of µit such as u and trend
(to capture the null). The significance (and "correct" sign) of cijt would favour the alter-
native hypothesis of the UTI in question. However very often T is too small to get reliable
estimates this way and in any event, ignoring cross tenure variation in wages will severly
reduce power under the alternative.
7.1 Adapting the SBP method:- An empirical illustration
SBP obtain composition bias free estimates of mean wages for each relevant tenure category.
For minu and Su this means using the panel dimension to control for worker characteristics
and averaging the residual wages in each tenure-time cell to obtain estinmates of the µkt .
These are then regressed on the relevant cell value of cijt.(ckt) (see for example Devereux and
Hart,2007) .However as argued above, equation (42) shows how this may lead to spurious
results. To eliminate this possibility, we suggest adding extra regressors to absorb the terms
in (42) i.e. those terms that would appear if our equal treatment model held true. Taking
the simplifying assumptions of the previous section on board again here (constant normalised
covariances and equal cyclicality of employment in high and low firms) it is easy to show
that we can linearise (42) to get
µk,t ' ak + bkµt + ck∆ut−k (48)
where µt is a weighted average of µht and µ
l
t. If we further assume that µt is driven by
a deterministic trend (t) and by aggregate unemployment (ut) we could regress (estimates
of) µk,t on t,ut,.∆ut−k, ckt and on tenure dummies allowing coeﬃcients on all but the last
two to diﬀer across tenures. Another way of viewing this procedure is to see it as a set of k
regressions, one for each tenure subject to the cross equation restriction of a single common
coeﬃcient on ckt. We call this the modified SBP method (MSBP). To apply it we first of all
need to use the panel dimension to factor out worker composition eﬀects from µk,t.
Our empirical model may be summarised as
wijt = ∇
0
xijt + ατijt + βcijt + wjt + vijt (49)
where cov(wjt, xijt) = 0
H0 : β = 0 H1β < 0
where xijt is a ax1 vector of worker characteristics such as educational attainment (it
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may also include worker fixed eﬀect dummies), τijt is worker tenure and vijt is an idiosyn-
cratic error term independent of all the RHS varaiables. As before wjt is an unobserved
firm j specific component of wages that will in general contain aggregate variates such as
unemployment and a time trend as well as idiosyncratic components such as firm specific
productivity shocks. The way the hypotheses are set up allows firm specific wage compo-
nents wjt to exist under H1. As noted in the introduction to this paper it is quite likely
that several contracting mechanisms simultaneously co-exist in a large economy in diﬀerent
sectors. Alternatively wages within a sector or firm may have a firm specific component
and a diﬀerential tenure related business cycle component.Equations (44),45 and (46) above
suggest that it may be impossible to reject the existence of firm specific wage components
in unmatched datasets.
Under the assumptions in (49) we can obtain consistent estimates of ∇ under both null
and alternative by executing the OLS regression
wijt = ∇
0
xijt +
X
k
X
t
µk,t∂kijt + eijt (50)
where ∂kijt is unity if the worker is of tenure k at time t. and zero otherwise. The tk
estimates of µk,t (bµk,t) provide us with composition-free wage means for each k, t cell to be
used in the second stage regression.
To illustrate this procedure and to get a handle on what diﬀerence it may make in US
panel data we collected an unbalanced panel dataset from the PSID. for the years 1976 to
1993. This is a period which nests the years selected by BDN (1976-84) and which displays
much time series volatility (an oil price shocks and two major recessions). It ends roughly at
about the same time as the "great moderation".started. We collected information on workers’
real log wages (real 1983 $ using the CPI deflator), occupation (7 categuories), education (7
categuories), State of residence, age, tenure (in years) and race (white, Hispanic, and other).
Despite diﬀerences between our data collection and that of BDN 30 our panel estimates for
minu, Su and u for the subsample in 1976-84 (the BDN years) are close to that obtained by
BDN as rows 1. to 6. in Table 2 show. Extending the data to 1993 and more than doubling
the number of observations makes little qualitative diﬀerence as lines 7. to 9. show although
the estimates are somewhat smaller in absolute value here. Adding year eﬀects - there is a
negative trend in aggregate wages during this period - does not change the sign or nominal
31 significance of the estimates.Finally all coeﬃcients on characteristics were correctly signed
and had reasonable orders of magnitude.
30Tenure was taken directly from answers to the question relating to "present employer". By contrast
BDN employ the algorithm of Altonji and Shakotko(1987) to modify the raw tenure data. However they
argue it made little diﬀerence to their results. We also note that average tenure from our data for the
relevant subsample is within 5% of BDN’s. BDN also have 13 industrial sectors, marital status and union
membership. They also add worker fixed eﬀects but their results show that these have little qualititative
impact on their results.
31The word nominal is used because of the Moulton problem.
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When it came to implementing the MSBP method.we encountered some problems At
large tenures, some tenure/year (k, t) cells were empty and some others contained too few
observations to give reliable estimates of wage means. To avoid null or sparsely populated
cells we computed cell means for 9 tenure categuories - tenures 0 to 8 and a final categuory
consisting of all tenures in excess of 8 years. Tables 3 gives the SBP and MSBP estimates
for the 1976-93 sample. Lines 1 and 2 show the results for the regression of bµk,t on trend,
tenure and minu and on trend, tenure and Su respectively. Minu and Su have "correct"
sign but only the former is significant. This is in keeping with results in the literature where
minu has been consistently found to be negative and siginificant in a variety of datasets and
specifications whereas success with Su.has been mixed.
Using (48) as a guide we add extra terms to absorb potential bias from equal treatment.
Explicitly we add ut and δktut (k = 0, 1, ..8), t and δktt (k = 0, 1....8), δkt∆ut−k(k = 0, 1...9)
and δkt(k = 0, 1..9). where δkt is a dummy variable indicating tenure k. Lines 3 and 4 show
that adding these terms reduces minu to being wholly insignificant and both Su and minu
take the wrong sign. Wald tests (available on request) on the 8 δktut.terms and on the 8
δkt terms were wholly insiginificant. However these terms turned out to be highly collinear
and a test for joint significance of all 16 of them had a p-value below 1%. The shortage of
degrees of freedom inhibit applying this method rigorously to the BDN years (37 regressors
but only 81 observations) but for completeness’ sake we report the results for this subsample
anyway in lines 5 to 8. Asymptotic inference is unreliable here but the results do seem to be
qualititatively similar.to those in the larger sample.
Before closing we note two more things. First, the δkt∆ut−k terms were significant (χ29
values of 22.4 and 21.9 in the minu and Su regressions respectively) and this is quite in-
tereresting. Whilst there may be stories to support existence for tenure varying trends and
intercepts (for example a complex rewards to tenure scheme), the existence of tenure varying
responses to the change in initial unemployment (∆ut−k) is hard to rationalise using eco-
nomic arguments. Second, and by contrast, there is an obvious caveat to this procedure.
Tenure related terms added to the regression will soak up a lot of the cross tenure variation
in minu and Su weakening their significance under the (alternative) hypothesis that they
determines wages. This brings us back to the point made earlier in the paper that the first
best solution to the problem is to expunge any common firm specific wage components from
wijt via the addition of firm-year interaction dummies to the original panel.
Table 2
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Panel estimates of Minu,Su and δu from the PSID
u Su Minu
BDN 1976-84 (N=19958)
1. −.020 (.002)
2. −.030 (.002)
3. −.045 (.003)
MST 1976-84 (N=19749)
4. −.023 (.002)
5. −.025 (.002)
6. −.054 (.003)
1976-93Panel (N=46057)
7. −.010 (.011)
8. −.017 (.001)
9. −.033 (.016)
Table 3
Estimates32 from the PSID using BSP and MBSP.
Su Minu τ t
SBP 1976-1993 (N=162)
1. −.015 (.006) .015 (.002) −.015 (.001)
2. −.003 (.059) .017 (.001) −.015 (.001)
MSBP 1976-1993 (N=162)
3. .001 (.013)
4. −.005 (.007)
N=162
SBP 1976-1984 (N=81)
5. −.046 (.008) .005 (.002) −.004 (.003)
6. −.025 (.008) .012 (.002) −.008 (.004)
MSBP 1976-1984 (N=81)
7. .007 (.027)
8. .002 (.012)
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:-
Note that in a single complete cross section the number of observations is the labour
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force at time t, Lt. Using this, the numerator in (4) is
scov(wijt, cijt) =
1
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nX
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LjtX
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⎞
⎠ (51)
We can substitute (2) into the RHS of (51) to get
scov(wijt, cijt) =
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where cjt =
LjtX
i=1
cijt and where the op(1) terms derive from the fact that the v0s are
idiosyncratic and that Lt goes to ∞ with n.
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=
1
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=
1
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Ã
scovf(wjt, cjt)− scovf(Ljt, wjt).
1
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nX
j=1
cjt
!
+ op(1)
which establishes (5) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2
It follows from this that the time t averages of wages (wt) are
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wt =
1
Lt
nP
j=1
LjtP
i=1
wijt =
1
Lt
Ã
1
n
nP
j=1
Ljtwjt
!
Again allowing n the number of firms to go to infinity gives us the probability limiit.33
p limwt =
γ0
L
+ µw
where µw = p lim( 1n
nP
j=1
wjt).and as before γ0 = p lim scovf(wjt, Ljt).
In general then wages would vary from firm to firm as would employment. In aggregate
however and in a large economy, employment and average wages at time t - whether measured
across firms or across a sample of individuals working at those firms - are constant over time.
34
We focus on bβ = 1svarp(cijt) (scovp(wijt, cijt)) with i = 1...Ljt, j = 1....n and t = 1, ...T ..
The superscript p denotes a sample covariance from full panel. As before we are only inter-
ested in the sign of bβ so we can focus on the p lim of the numerator alone.
We can always write a sample covariance over T time periods as a weighted average of
the within time covariances plus "across time" covariances i.e.
scovp(wijt, cijt) ≡
TX
t=1
ptscov(wijt, cijt) +
TX
t=1
pt(wt − w)(ct − c) (56)
where w = 1N
TP
t=1
nP
j=1
LjtP
i=1
wijt.is the average wage in the entire panel, pt = LtN
35 is the pro-
portion of panel observations (N) occurring at time t. Our assumption for wages implies
that
p limwt = p limw t = 1, ..T
Under these assumptions the second term in (56) vanishes asymptotically and (20) and (21)
33Note that we assume the number of firms is constant across time. This is purely to save notation.
It would not change anything if we allowed the number of firms to vary over time and instead based a
probability limit on nmin = min(n1, n2...nT )− > ∞. Similarly allowing firm composition to change across
time would merely increase notation: - All workers are identical and firms only diﬀer in that each has its
own wage driven by an idiosyncratic shock(s).
34As we have already noted we require some movement in aggregate labour supply over time as a device
to generate some variation in minu and Su over individual workers in the panel.
35Note that p lim pt = 1T so panel sample covariances are the simple unweighted average of their cross
sectional counterparts.
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in the text directly follow.
Proof of Proposition 3
We show the result for bβρminu. Adaptation of the analysis below to δu, Su and to sample
means computed in Section 7 is obvious and straightforward and is available on request.
The numerator of bβρminu for a random sample from a single cross section at time t can be
found via a simple adaptation of (12) namely
Numerator(bβρminu) = − 1Lρt
∞X
k=1
sk(γfρk −
Lρt−k
Lρt
γfρ0 )(u
m
t−k+1 − umt−k) (57)
The assumptions in (22) and (23) imply that
p lim(L
ρ
t ) = ρLt
p lim γfρk = p lim{scovf(ρLjt−k, wjt)}+ p lim{scovf(εjt−kLjt−k, wjt)} = ργk
p lim
Lρt−k
Lρt
= p lim
Lρt−k/n
Lρt /n
=
Lt−k
Lt
Using these three probability limits in (57) we see that the numerator in bβρminu is asymp-
totically unchanged by random sampling.
For the denominator we have
Denominator(bβρminu) = 1Lρt/n
⎧
⎨
⎩
nX
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LρjtX
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minu2ijt/n
⎫
⎬
⎭−
½
1
Lρt/n
¾2⎧⎨
⎩
nX
j=1
LρjtX
i=1
minuijt/n
⎫
⎬
⎭
2
(58)
=
1
Lρt/n
{Aρ/n}−
½
1
Lρt /n
¾2
{Bρ/n }2
We can expand the terms Aρ and Bρ by adapting (9) above to get
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This shows that both terms in the denominator (Aρ and Bρ) are weighted sums of "head
counts" of workers of diﬀerent tenures surviving within firm j. They are therefore linear
in
nP
j=1
Lρjt−k.k = 0, 1..Note also that setting ρ = 1 in the above expressions gives us the
corresponding formulae for the full sample. Using (22) and (23) and taking probability
limits gives
p limAρ/n = ρ.p lim
nX
j=1
Ã
Ljtu
2
t −
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skLjt−k(u
m 2
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!
/n = ρ.p limA1/n (59)
p limBρ/n = ρ.p lim
Ã
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!
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Taking probability limits of (58), using p lim( 1Lρt /n) =
1
ρp lim(
1
Lt/n
).therein and using (59)
and (60) gives a new form for (58) as
p lim{Denominator(bβρminu)} = p lim{ 1Lρt/n}.p lim{Aρ/n}−
µ
p lim{ 1
Lρt/n
}.p lim{Bρ/n}
¶2
= p lim(
1
Lt/n
).p lim{A1/n}−
µ
p lim{ 1
Lt/n
}.p lim{B1/n}
¶2
= p lim{Denominator(bβ1minu)}
where again we have used bβ1minu to denote the estimate based on the full sample.
This establishes the Proposition.
46
References
[1] Altonji, J. (1986) "Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Supply: Evidence from Micro
Data".Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94 pp176-215.
[2] Altonji, J and R.Shakotko (1987). "Do wages rise with job seniority?". Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol 54. pp437-59.
[3] Baker G, Gibbs, M. and B. Holmstrom (1994). "The Wage Policy of a Firm," The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pp. 921-55.
[4] Solon, G, Barsky, R and J Parker(1994). "Measuring the Cyclicality of Real Wages: How
Important Is Composition Bias?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol.
109(1), pages 1-25, February.
[5] Beaudry, P. and J. Dinardo (1991)."The Eﬀect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement
of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 99 (4), pp. 665-88, August.
[6] Blanchard, O. and L. Summers (1986). "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment
Problem", Macroeconomics Annual, 1.
[7] Cahuc, P,Postel-Vinay, F. and J-M. Robin (2006).“Wage Bargaining with On-the-job
Search: Theory and Evidence”, Econometrica, Vol 74 No.2, pp323-64.
[8] Carneiro,A. Guimares, P. and P.Portugal (2009) "Real Wages and the Business Cycle:
Accounting for Worker and Firm Heterogeneity," IZA Discussion Papers 4174.
[9] Carruth, A. and A. Oswald (1987). "On Union Preferences and Labour Market Models:
Insiders and Outsiders", Economic Journal, Vol. 97 pp 431-45, June
[10] Devereux, P.and R.A.Hart(2006 )."Real Wage Cyclicality of Job Stayers, Within-
Company Job Movers, and Between-Company Job Movers," Industrial and Labor Re-
lations Review, Vol 60 No. 1 pp105-119
[11] Elsby, M. (2009). "Evaluating the Economic Significance of Downward Nominal Wage
Rigidity", Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 56, no. 2
[12] Estevao, M. and B. Wilson (1998). "Nominal Wage Rigidity and
Real Wage Cyclicality", Finance and Economics Discussion Se-
ries 1998-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(U.S.).http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1998/199821/199821pap.pdf
[13] Even, W.E. and David A. Macpherson(1996). "Employer Size and Labor Turnover: The
Role of Pensions",Industrial and Labour Relations Review, vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 707-728
47
[14] Montuenga, V. García, I and M. Fernández(2006)."Regional Wage Flexibility: the Wage
Curve in Five EU Countries", in The European Labour Market, AIEL Series in Labour
Economics, 2006, 245-265, DOI: 10.1007/3-7908-1680-9_12
[15] Grant, Darren (2003).“The Eﬀect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages
over the Business Cycle: Evidence from National Longitudinal Surveys”, Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 56, 393—408.
[16] Gertler and Tregari (2009). "Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash Wage
Bargaining", Journal of Political Economy, vol 117 no. 1.
[17] Montuenga, V., García, I. and M. Garcia. (2006). "Regional Wage Flexibility: the Wage
Curve in Five EU Countries" in "The European Labour Market" AIEL Series in Labour
Economics, 2006, 245-265,
[18] Hagedorn, M. and I.Manovskii (2010), "Spot Wages over the Business Cycle?", Working
Paper, October.http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~manovskii/papers/Spot_Wages.pdf
[19] Hall, R.E. (2005). "Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness",
American Economic Review, vol. 95 no.1
[20] Kilponen, J and Santavirta(2010). "New Evidence on Implicit Contracts from Linked
Employer-Employee Data", Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 12/2010.
[21] Kudlyak, M (2009). “The Cyclicality of the User Cost of Labor with Search and Match-
ing.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working
[22] Paper 09-12 (September).
[23] Lallemand, T,. Plasman, R.and F.Rycx (2003) "The establishment-size wage premium:
evidence from European countries". Empirica, Vol 35 no.4
[24] Lindbeck, A. and D.Snower (2001). "Insiders Versus Outsiders" Journal of Economic
Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pp 165-188, Winter.
[25] Lockwood, B and A.Manning (1989). "Dynamic wage-employment bargaining with em-
ployment adjustment costs", Economic Journal, Vol 99 pp. 1143-1158.
[26] Mcdonald, J and C.Worswick(1999). "Wages, Implicit Contracts, and the Business Cy-
cle: Evidence from Canadian Micro Data", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107 No.4,
pp 884-892.
[27] Martins, Snell and Thomas (2005). "Wage Dynamics, Cohort Eﬀects, and Limited Com-
mitment Models", Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol 3 pp353-359
[28] Martins, Snell and Thomas (2010). "Real and Nominal Wage Rigidity in a Model of
Equal-Treatment Contracting", forthcoming in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics
(Earlier version: IZA DP 4346.)
48
[29] Montuenga, Garcia and Fernandez(2006),
[30] Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)."Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of
Unemployment", Review of Economic Studies,vol 61, pp. 397-415.
[31] Moscarini, G. and F. Postel-Vinay, 2008, “The Timing of Labor Market Expansions:
New Facts and a New Hypothesis”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 23, 1-51.
[32] Moulton, Brent (1990). "An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Eﬀects of Aggre-
gate Variables on Micro Units", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72(2),
pp. 334-338.
[33] Oi, W.Y. and L.T. Idson (1999), "Firm Size and Wages", "The Handbook of Labour
Economics", Vol 3, Part 2 pp2165-2214 (Elsevier)
[34] Rossi-Hansberg, E. and M.Wright, (2007) "Establishment Size Dynamics in the Aggre-
gate Economy", American Economic Review, vol 97, No.5
[35] Schmieder, J and T vonWachter (2010) "DoesWage Persistence Matter for Employment
Fluctuations? Evidence from Displaced Workers"American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, Volume 2, Number 3, July 2010 , pp. 1-21(21)
[36] Shapiro and J. Stiglitz(1984)."Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline De-
vice", American Economic Review, vol.74 no. 3
[37] Shin, D. and K.Shin (2003). "Why Are The Wages of Job Stayers Procyclical?,"
ISER Discussion Paper 0573, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka
University.(http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2003/DP0573.pdf)
[38] Snell, A. and J.Thomas (2010) "Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment, and Wage-
Unemployment Dynamics", forthcoming in the American Economics Journal: Macro-
economics.
49
